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Introduction

This study is concerned with the extent to which modern France
has become a "welfare state." The term "welfare state" is not
subject to precise definition, for practically all modern governments
are concerned in greater or lesser degree with the well-being of their
citizens. But since the publication of the Beveridge Report in 1942,
the phrase has become roughly descriptive of government activities
which are redistributive in character. The welfare state, in other
words, has to do with the use of government power as an instrument
for the redistribution of income in society, generally with the dual
objectives of greater equality in the distribution of money income,
and a guarantee of some minimum standard of well-being for all
citizens. These objectives may be brought about directly through
a redistribution of money income, or indirectly through the provision of services to some segments of the population on some basis
other than the costs of those services. However it may be managed,
the existence of a welfare state means an alteration in the pattern
of income distribution.
Since the end of World War II France has created machinery
for the redistribution of income as comprehensive as any now existing among western nations. In some respects, in fact, France has
become more of a welfare state than the United Kingdom, although
the latter is perhaps more generally looked upon as the classic
example of this phenomenon. In the analysis which follows, this
1
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study will be concerned primarily with two aspects of the welfare
state as it functions in contemporary France. First, the study will
show the extent to which the nation's social security system has
become an instrument for the redistribution of income in the
economy; and, second, it will analyze the manner in which the pattern of income distribution is altered as a result of welfare expenditures by the government. The study also stresses a number of important structural characteristics of the economy, and shows how
these have influenced the functioning of the welfare state in France.
The study is organized as follows: Chapter I is in the nature of
an essay on the theoretical aspects of income redistribution, and its
purpose is to provide a general framework for the empirical analysis
that follows. Chapter 2 describes in detail the organization and
workings of the French social security system. Chapter 3 analyzes
income redistribution via transfer expenditures in the French
economy on an aggregate basis, and makes a comparison with similar
practices in the United Kingdom and the United States. Chapter
4 is concerned with the actual distribution of money income in
France, and the way in which this distribution is altered by the
apparatus of the welfare state. Chapter 5, the final chapter, is in
the nature of a commentary on the phenomenon of the welfare state.
There is attached an appendix containing a brief comment upon
sources and additional statistical data.
The major portion of the research for this study was completed
in France in 1957-58, during the tenure of my Fulbright Research
Fellowship. I wish to express my appreciation to the International
Educational Exchange Service of the Department of State for this
grant, which made it possible to take time off from teaching and
other duties at the University of Nebraska for a year of study and
research abroad.
VVALLACE C. PETERSON
Paris
June, 1958
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The Theoretical Problem

will be discussed some theoretical aspects of
income redistribution so as to establish a framework for the
later analysis of income and its redistribution in the French
economy. Essentially, the remarks in this chapter are concerned
with the means by which the state may modify the distribution of
income to persons in a society. It should be fairly evident that
governments do, willfully or not, affect the distribution of income
in society, for the state collects taxes and dispenses various services
or benefits, and usually taxes are not collected from nor services
distributed to income-recipients in the same proportion. This, then,
is the nub of the theoretical problem, for whenever some receive
more and others less from government than what they pay to government in the form of taxes, there is a redistribution of income.

I

N THIS CHAPTER

THE MEANING OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION

Ideally, analysis of the redistribution of income should attempt
to consider the effects of all government activity that in some way
modifies an initial distribution of income. The phrase "an initial
distribution of income" is meant to apply to a situation in which income distribution is determined on a functional basis in competitive
markets, and the activities of government are "neutral" in the sense
that these activities do not in any way modify the market-determined distribution of income. The idea of the neutrality of
public finance implies that by some means the citizens of a community or nation, in the absence of any formal state apparatus,
would have purchased the same array of goods and services as they
do collectively through the instrumentality of the state. This, of
course, is a purely imaginary situation, but the concept of the
neutrality of public finance is a convenient point of departure
for a discussion of income and its distribtuioD.

3
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But even simply as a theoretical concept, the idea of an initial
distribution of income subject to modification by public activity
is not free of difficulty. Actually, the existence of the state or government means' that the functional distribution of income will necessarily be different from what it would be in the absence of a formal
state apparatus. There are two reasons why this is likely. First, the
functional distribution of income depends indirectly upon the
structure of total demand, because in the market prices paid for
the services of productive resources are linked to the kinds of goods
and services demanded by potential buyers. And contrary to the
remarks above pertaining to the neutrality of public finance, it is
perhaps inevitable that the mere existence of a state, will ,modify
the structure of total demand. It is hardly likely, in other words,
that citizens, in the absence of the state, would prefer exactly the
same collection of goods and services that are purchased when some
such collective entity as the state exists. Second, it would be naive
to attribute the functional distribution of income wholly to the
mechanism of the competitive market. Even a casual analysis
of the economy reveals the existence of numerous conflicts and
power struggles centering on the distribution of income, and, these
latter necessarily modify the way in which income distribtuion is
shaped by market forces. The state, even if its activities are not
redistributional in intent, will exert an influence simply because
it cannot help but modify the outcome of power conflicts among
private groups. It is thus necessary to accept the state as a part of
the institutional setting of the economy, and aim the analysis, thereby, at the public activities that can be clearly identified as having
redistributive effects. It is still necessary to begin with an initial
distribution of income, but this should now be interpreted to mean
the functional distribution of income that results from some given
level of economic activity, including that part of the national output which originates in the public sector. More specifically, the
phrase "the initial distribution of income" refers to the allocaton
of the national income by distributive shares in the form of wages
and salaries, rents, interests, and profits. These latter, the sum of
which constitute the factor cost of the national output, represent
claims to income based upon the contribution of such economic
resources as land, labor, and capital to the market value of current
output. Income redistribution, therefore, is concerned with the
way in which the state may alter an initial distribution of income
defined in this manner.
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The above needs to be qualified slightly, since, from the viewpoint of income redistribution, the more meaningful concept is that
of personal income. This may be defined as the money income
actually received by persons or households, and it will differ from
the national income because some of the factor income earned during the productive process does not actually find its way into the
hands of individuals as money income received. Personal income
subject to a withholding tax, or corporate earnings retained within
the enterprise are examples of this. Nevertheless, the concept of
the national income remains the logical point of departure for the
analysis, as this represents income earned from supplying resources
to entrepreneurs, including the state as an entrepreneur; thus the
distribution of personal income depends upon a prior distribution
of income in the functional or factoral sense. Analysis of income
redistribution then becomes a study of the way in which the state
inten-enes to alter the pattern of personal income distribution
derived. from an initial functional distribution.
The public sector of the economy is engaged in two major types
of activities, both of which can be measured by the expenditures
incurred in carrying out these activities. On the one hand, the
government provides a broad array of services to the citizens of a
community, ranging from national defense to the provision of
police and fire protection. In the terminology of national inc()mc
accounting, the value of these services is equal to government expenditures for goods and services. 1 Many of these services are
of a collective character in the sense that they are productive of
benefits that are enjoyed by the recipients only through membership in the community. They are, in other words,"indivisible,"
and cannot, as a practical matter, be provided for by the market
mechanism. National defense expenditure is a case in point, for
expenditures for this purpose clearly yield benefits to the citizens
of a particular country, but it is equally obvious that this is a kind
of benefit that cannot be consumed or enjoyed on an individual
basis. The productive character of public activities results simply
from the fact that expenditure by governmental units creates

1 These expenditures have another dimension. for they are received as income by those who sell goods and services to the government. As such, however,
they si~ply represent factor income originating in the public sector of the
economy and are no more redistributional of income per se than factor payments originating in the private sector.

6
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values which benefit the whole community.2 Economic evaluation
of these benefits is an especially difficult problem, because they are
not generally distributed through the machinery of the market.
The most feasible, though not necessarily the most satisfactory,
solution is to value the services and benefits associated with them at
their cost to the public sector, that is, by the amount of government
expenditures for goods and services.
Besides providing for a broad array of services, the state also
engages in a variety of transfer activities. That is, some government
expenditures are simply transfer expenditures in that they result
only in the transfer of income from one group or person to another
group or person. A transfer is distinguished from other government
expenditures in that no equivalent value in either product or productive services is received in exchange. Transfers include expenditures such as old-age pensions, family allowances, unemployment compensation, veterans' benefits, interest on the public debt,
etc. The common element in all such expenditures is that they
do not bring a return flow of goods or services to the government.
With respect to transfers it should be noted that some of the
services provided by government are, in effect, nonmonetary transfers. This would be true for such services as low-rental housing or
free medical care. The recipients of these services benefit through
obtaining them at a price below their real cost as measured by
government expenditures for the resources necessary to provide
the services. But since services of this kind absorb resources in
the same way as do government expenditures for services of a collective character, they should be lumped together with the latter
and clearly distinguished from expenditures that result solely in
a transfer of money income.
While it is important for analytical purposes to stress the
differences between government expenditures for goods and services
which are productive of either collective or individual values and
• Some economists have argued that government expenditures for goods and
services should not be considered as a part of final output, rather, that these
expenditures should be regarded as a type of intermediate product, because
the existence of a stable and orderly society, made possible by such expenditures,
is a prerequisite for aU production. The difficulty with this argument, as Alan
T. Peacock has pointed out, is that it could be extended to practically all forms
of consumption, since consumption is, in a broad sense, a prerequisite to pro·
duction. See Alan T. Peacock, "The Social Services in Great Britain and the
Redistribution of Income," in Alan T. Peacock (Ed.), Income Redistribution
and Public Policy, London: Cape. 1954.
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government expenditures which merely effect a transfer of money
income, it is equally necessary to emphasize certain factors common
to both types of expenditure. First, we should recall that all expenditures result in benefits of either a monetary or nonmonetary
nature. These benefits have their impact on the disposable real
income of the consumer, either directly by augmenting his personal
income, as do money transfers, or indirectly by providing the
consumer with certain services at a lower price (or at no price) than
would have prevailed in the absence of state action. This principle
is clearly applicable for such things as free education or free or
low-cost medical care, for in such instances both the recipient of
the services and the real cost of the latter can be readily determined.
It is less clearly apparent by what means this principle can be
applied to government services that are collective in character,
but it is maintained, nevertheless, that the principle has validity
for all public activity. To argue otherwise would be to assert that
government activity is unproductive.
The second thing to note concerning government expenditures
is that they require the diversion of resources from the private to
the public sector of the economy. To the extent that the government provides services-either collective or individual-real resources are diverted to the public sector as a result of the purchase
of goods and factor services by governmental units. It is, incidentally,
this component of total government expenditure that is a measure
of the "burden" of government on the economy, because such expenditures represent the quantity of current real output being
absorbed by the public sector for its purposes. Transfer expenditures do not necessitate a direct diversion of real resources from
private to public use, but they do require a diversion of financial
resources, generally in the form of some portion of the consumer's
current money income.
The allocation of both real and financial resources to the public
sector is accomplished by the process of taxation. Governments,
in other words, normally depend upon taxation as the source of
their revenues. 3 The more meaningful significance of this is that
8 It should be noted that the taxation proceo;s may affect the price or resources, either directly or indirectly, and, consequently, there will be repercussions on the structure of demand. This underscores what was pointed out
earlier about the difficulties inherent in the idea of the neutrality of public
finance. Moreover, to the extent that the government resorts to borrowing, there
may be price effects with respect to commodities and resources, which may affect
indirectly beth the si7e and composition of the national output.

8
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the real cost of all public activity is, in the last analysis, borne by
the citizens of the community in their capacity as taxpayers. If
we grant this to be true, it logically follows that the real burden
of taxation may vary from individual to individual and from group
to group. As long as the proportion of total taxes paid by an
individual or particular group differs from the proportionate share
of the individual or group in total income received, the tax burden
will be unequal. And what is true for taxation is equally true for
government expenditure. That is to say, the benefits derived from
government-provided services and money transfers will also vary
from individual to individual and from group to group.
Consequently, we can state as a general principle that there
will be a redistribution of income whenever the cost of public
activity borne by a particular group in the economy differs from
the benefits that the same group receives from public activity. An
ideal study of income redistribution would involve an allocation
of the total tax burden to specific groups and an allocation of the
benefits arising from government expenditure to the same groupS.4
If this were done, then the difference between the total tax burden
of the group and the total benefits received by the group would
measure the gain or loss sustained by persons in the group as a
result of public activity. In the following section we shall examine
in greater detail the various means by which the state may bring
about this result.
THE MEANS TO REDISTRIBUTION

There are, in effect, three broad means by which the state may
directly affect the distribution of income.'; The first concerns the
unequal burden of taxation; the second the unequal distribution
of money benefits or transfers; and the third the provision by
government of nonmonetary services to particular groups or persons in the economy. Each of these will be discussed in turn.
The tax system will be redistributive of income if particular income or social groups hold a different proportion of the total
• The specific limitations of this study with respect to the redistribution of
income in France are set forth on page 17.
• There will be indirect or secondary effects resulting from redistributional
measures. In the matter of taxation, for example, the direct effect is the reduction in income resulting from the tax, while the indirect or secondary effect has
to do with the repercussions of this upon subsequent flows of expenditure and
income. The direct effect is subject to measurement, but the latter is not, at least
in any practical sense.
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money income after payment of taxes than they do before payment
of taxes. If the tax system is at all progressive, there will be are,
distribution of income in the direction of greater equality because
the proportionate share of the upper-income groups in the total
income will be reduced and the proportionate share of the lowerincome groups will be raised. A progressive tax structure must
bring about this result because the effective rate of taxation-the
ratio of total taxes paid to income received-increases with the
size of the income. This means, in other words, that the proportionate share of the total tax burden is greater for the upperincome groups, hence there will be a redistribution in the direction
of greater equality.
The major problem in any attempt to determine the extent to
which a given tax structure brings about redistribution of income is
that of determining the incidence of taxation. Since most modern
governments employ many different types of taxes to obtain their
revenue, this is a problem of considerable complexity. The problem, moreover, has a dual aspect, for, on the one hand, it is necessary to identify the persons or groups upon whom the taxis
nominally levied, and, on the other, to identify the income recipients who actually pay the tax. The latter is the problem of the
ultimate incidence of taxation.
Analysis of the probable incidence of different types of taxes
can be facilitated if we divided all taxes into three broad categories. s First of all there are direct taxes, i.e., taxes levied directly
upon income or wealth. The personal income tax, the corporation
income tax, estate and gift taxes, and social security taxes levied
against employees all fall within this category. Second, there are
social security taxes paid by employers, which, for reasons discussed
below, warrant treatment as a separate category. Finally, there
are indirect taxes, which consist essentially of taxes whose ultimate
incidence is presumed to be different from the person or article
subject to the tax. Excise and sales taxes are the most common type
of taxes in this category.
The problem of the incidence of direct taxation is relatively
simple because it is generally presumed that such taxes cannot be

• No attempt is made here to treat the problem of the incidence of taxation
in detail. Rather, the purpose is simply to emphasize those aspects of the incidence protlem that are particularly relevant to the problem under consideration.

10
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shifted. 7 This is certainly true for the personal income tax and the
social security tax paid by the employee, although the ultimate incidence of taxes on profits may be somewhat more complicated. In
a purely competitive world in which entrepreneurs always operated
at the point of profit maximization, a tax on profits could not be
shifted. But in the imperfect real economic world this may not be
true, and some shifting of such taxes may take place. The extent
to which the latter actually happens is, perhaps, impossible to
determine. In any event, the most realistic assumption with respect
to direct taxation is that such taxes are not shifted. Then the
problem becomes simply one of determination of the amount of
direct taxes paid by particular income and/or social groups.
Social security taxes levied against the employer present a unique
problem, for one needs to decide whether they should be treated
as a direct tax on income or as an indirect tax which may be shifted
in whole or in part. Theoretically, it is feasible to view the social
security tax levied against the employer as a direct tax on income
if the amount of such taxes is treated as income in the personal income account. In national income accounting such taxes are considered as part of the wages and salaries component of the factor
cost of the national output, hence they are looked upon as part
of income earned in the production process. But from the standpoint of analysis of income redistribution this approach lacks realism; it is not likely that wage-earners and other salaried persons
regard these taxes as a part of their personal income. In fact, it
is more in keeping with reality to view such taxes as an indirect
levy against the employer which may be shifted. It is possible that
these taxes could be shifted backward to the employee through a
reduction in money wages,S but this too is not particularly realistic.
From the employer's point of view social security taxes are simply
a part of labor costs, and, like other costs of production, they will
be borne by the consumer. This would particularly seem to be the
situation when such taxes constitute a significant portion of total
labor costs, as is the case in France. Moreover, in an inflationary era
such as has characterized most of the post-World War II period, the
Harold M. Groves, Financing Government, New York: Holt, 1939, p. 145.
• In a purely competitive market situation the wage, including the employer's
contribution to social security, will be equal to the marginal product of labor.
Thus an increase in the employer's tax for social security, ceteris paribus, would
be shifted backwards by a reduction in money wages. But this type of analytical
model is quite remote from the reality of the labor market, particularly in an
era of strong inflationary pressures and effective trade unionism.
7

The TheO'retical Problem

/

11

most realistic assumption is that such taxes are shifted forward.
Thus their ultimate incidence is on the consumer.
With respect to the incidence of indirect taxation, no single
generalization will suffice, although there is a strong presumption
that their incidence is primarily on the consumer. Producers, of
course, will regard these taxes as a part of the costs of doing business, and will attempt to shift such taxes forward via price increases.
The actual extent to which prices in the market change as a result
of taxes on sales or production will depend upon a complex of
variables, including the elasticities of demand and supply, the degree of monopoly in a particular market, and the effect of the
Diagram I
The Incidence of Indirect Taxation

Price

S'

D

Quantity
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taxes on consumer demand. The mechanism by which price changes
as a result of an indirect tax can be illustrated with a simple diagram
of: price determination (see Diagram. I).
, In Diagram I, DD and SS represent the respective demand -and
sNpply curves before the imposition of the tax. Market price is
at 'PI and output (or sales) at Ql' . After the taX the supply curve
shifts to S'S', the vertical distance between SS and S'S' representing
rhe amount of the tax. Since demand (DD) is less than perfectly
elastic, price in the market has risen by less than the full amount
of· the tax, i.e., the distance P 1 P 2 • This means that the tax is borne
pa:rtly by the consumer and partly by the producer; the'exact manner in which the tax burden is divided between the consumer and
the supplier depends upon the relative elasticities of demand and
supply. In general, the more inelastic the deinand the more nearly
price will rise by the full amount of the tax, and the more inelastic
conditions of supply, the less market price wiII rise as a result of the
tax.
In one sense, though, it can be argued that the whole of the
incidence is on the consumer, irrespective of the price change in
the market as a result of the tax. This is so because the consumer
wiII pay for a particular quantity of the commodity a price that
is higher by the amount of the tax than he would pay for the same
quantity in the absence of the tax. In the diagram the consumer
pays the price P 2 for the quantity Q2 after the tax, but in the absence of the tax the same quantity could be obtained at the price
P g • The distance P g P 2 is equal to the amount of the tax.
This diagrammatic exposition of the incidence of tax-shifting
oversimplifies the situation because of its essentially static character.
The whole of the incidence may very well be on the consumer -if,
along with the imposition of the tax, there is a shift in demand.
Thus it is possible that market price may rise by the full amount
of the tax if the demand curve (DD) shifts significantly to the right.
In an inflationary era effective demand wiII undoubtedly be rising,
and this wiII make it relatively easy for producers to shift nearly
the whole of indirect taxation forward. Thus we can conclude
that the probabilities are that in any period characterized by strong
inflationary pressures the incidence of indirect taxation will largely
be on the consumer.
As noted earlier, the benefits associated with government expenditure of all types will be redistributive whenever benefits are
received in a proportion different from income. Granted this, the
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problem then is determination, of the incidence of the benefits of
government activity. Benefits; like taxes, may be divided into three
broad categories. First, there are direct money transfers to spe€ific
individuals or groups. Second, there are nonmonetary transfers
which are directed to specific individuals or groups. Finally, there
are the indivisible benefits which cannot be consumed or enjoyed
on an individual basis;
The incidence problem for the first two categories of benefits is
relatively simple, for it is primarily a matter of identifying the
specific persons or groups which are the recipients of either money
or nonmonetary transfers. Once this is done the incidence problem
is solved, for there would be little logic in any assumption as to the
shiftability of such transfers. 9 The incidence of indivisible benefits
is, however, another matter. While it is logical to assume that these
benefits cannot be shifted, there is no objective way to determine
the degree to which specific individuals or groups benefit from
expenditures in this category. Such benefits could be allo~ated on
a per capita basis on the assumption that all persons benefit equally
from the existence of a well-ordered and stable society. Or they
could be allocated in proportion to income on the assumption
that the income of a person is a satisfactory measure of the stake
the individual has in the continued existence of the economic and
social order. Finally, the indivisible benefits could be distributed
in the same proportion as taxes paid; the assumption here is simply
that the tax burden is an adequate measure of the individual's
stake in the social order.1° Actually all three techniques for the
allocation of indivisible benefits are arbitrary because no objective
criteria for this purpose exist. Perhaps the only way to avoid
entanglement in a highly subjective argument is simply to allocate
such benefits, if this must be done, on a per capita basis.
PATIERNS OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION

The foregoing section was concerned with the major means
available to the state for alteration of the distribution of income .
.In this section we shall narrow the discussion somewhat and consider possible ways in which the functioning of a social security
• An exception to this are subsidies to business firms, for these, it should be
assumed, are shifted to the consumer.
10 The underlying assumption in. all three instances is that all persons have
a stake in a stable order, and that the latter is the end-product of general
government expenditures for goods and services.
.
.
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system will affect the income distribution pattern. The term "social
security" is used in a broad sense to refer to all government transfer
expenditures that are undertaken for welfare purposes. We shall
not be concerned with the imputation of costs and benefits resulting from government expenditures of a more general character.
To analyze the way in which a social security system brings about
a redistribution of a nation's national income, it is necessary to
begin with the allocation of income and tax payments to different
income and social classes. The simplest way to do this is to employ
the techniques used in national income and social accounting, and
for each income and/or social class to construct a table of income
received and taxes paid, as shown below.

Income
1. Factor income
2. Money transfers from
government
3. Monetary value of transfers
in kind from government

Taxes
4. Social security taxes paid
5. Direct taxes paid for social
security
6. Indirect taxes paid for
social security

The income recipients within the group normally receive income from participation in production-i.e., factor income-and this
income may be augmented by either the receipt of money transfers
from government, the receipt of services from government, or both.
The monetary value of all these constitutes the real income of the
recipient for the period in question. On the other hand, some
portion of all taxes paid by the individual income recipients will
be used to finance the welfare expenditures of the government.
There will be, then, a redistribution of income for members of
the income and/or social class whenever the monetary value of all
social security benefits differs from the sum of taxes paid by members of the group for the support of social security. In the above
table redistribution takes place whenever 2 -+- 3 is different from
4 -+- 5 -+- 6.
From the point of view of the group to which the individual
belongs there will be a redistribution of income in favor of the
group if the benefits received are in excess of the social security
taxes paid; if the opposite is true there will be a redistribution of
income at the expense of the group in question and in favor of
other groups in the economy. Beyond this, there are a number of
different possibilities with respect to the actual pattern of income
redistribution that may emerge as a result of the workings of a
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social security system. These possibilities will be briefly explored
in the following paragraphs.
First, it is possible, in theory, that welfare or social security
expenditures are financed wholly by transfers from one social class
to another. In other words, it is possible that the redistribution
of income effected by a social security system may be wholly along
class lines. The system might be so constituted, for example, that
wage-earners are the chief beneficiaries, while the costs of the system
fall almost wholly on other social classes. The Labour Party in
Great Britain, it would seem, envisaged a system along these lines
when it came to power after the war, although in actuality the
workings of the British social security system turned out quite
differently.ll
A second possibility is that social security benefits are financed
wholly by income transfer within the social class. This would be
the case, for example, if taxation for social security was uniform
within the group, but members of the group benefitted from social
security expenditure in varying proportions. The family allowance
feature of the French social security structure tends to operate in
this fashion, as the cash benefits received are directly dependent
upon the number of children in a family. The extent to which a
social security system actually functions in this way depends upon
the nature of the benefits and eligibility for the latter, as well as
the kind of taxes imposed to finance the system. In a general sense
this tendency is operative in any system in which the active population as a whole is taxed and important benefits (e.g., pensions) flow
to nonactive elements of the population.
It is also possible that a system might function in such a way as to
bring about a redistribution of income from the upper-income to
the lower-income groups. Insofar as income groups are roughly
identifiable with particular social classes, this possibility is similar
to the first mentioned above. However, this is rarely the case in
actuality. In any event, this particular pattern of redistribution
would come about if practically all the beneficiaries of social expenditure were found in the lower-income brackets and the system
were financed wholly by a progressive tax on incomes. This, of
course, is not the usual practice, for most existing systems adhere
to a greater or lesser degree to the principle that the beneficiaries
11 }'indley Weaver, "Taxation and Redistribution in the United Kingdom,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, August, 1950, pp. 201-213.
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should contribute to the support of the system. But it is true in
practice that this pattern frequently emerges with respect to more
general government expenditures of a welfare character (i.e., education, public health, etc.) whenever there exists a significant degree
of progression in the tax structure.
Determination of the pattern of income redistribution that results from the functioning of a system of social security cannot, of
course, be separated from the general question of the incidence
of taxation. This is so because the whole matter hinges, in a sense,
on identification of the groups that actually pay the cost of the
various social services. Some remarks, therefore, are in order at
this point with respect to the possible and/or probable incidence
of taxes that may be employed to finance social security expenditure.
The incidence problem would be quite simple if the system were
wholly self-financed, that is, financed by direct taxes levied on the
beneficiaries of the system. If this were the case it would be relatively easy to determine the extent to which there was a redistribution of
income between income or social groups. But in actual practice
this is seldom the case. Two difficulties in particular are likely to
be encountered with respect to the finances of the system and their
incidence.
First, social security taxes proper-i.e., taxes levied directly on
the beneficiaries of the system-may not be adequate to cover all
outlays of funds by the system.· A part of the latter's costs, in other
words, must be covered by the general revenue of the government.
This creates the additional problem of determining what propor·
tion of other direct taxes on individuals are to be allocated to social
security expenditure. There is the parallel problem of the incidence
of these taxes. Even these problems would not be especially difficult
of solution if all government expenditures were financed by direct
taxation and if the government did not incur a deficit. Unfortunately these admittedly ideal conditions seldom exist in the real economic world.
Second, difficulties of a particularly complex character will arise
whenever a government depends upon indirect taxation for a part
of its revenue. This is so because of the price effects that are associated with indirect taxation. The existence of indirect taxation
as a major source of revenue requires both that the incidence of
these taxes be determined and that the proportion of total revenue
raised by these taxes that is to be allocated to social security expenditure be determined. The former requires a precise knowledge
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not only of income but, more importantly, of consumption patterns
for all income and social groups; all too frequently such knowledge
does not exist. Moreover, any allocation of tax revenue from
different tax sources to social security expenditure will be arbitrary,
for there is no way to determine for most government budgets the
exact use of revenue from a particular source.
The difficulties discussed above as respects determination of the
incidence of social security taxes suggest a final remark of a general
nature about the probable pattern of income redistribution. If the
system is not wholly self-financed, it is quite probable that all
income or social groups in the society may experience a net gain
insofar as the monetary or cash benefits of the system are concerned.
That is, all groups may receive more in the way of direct money
income from the system than they pay in direct taxes to support the
system. This has dearly been the case in France. 12 It may be the
result whenever a significant portion of total monetary benefits are
financed by indirect taxation. If this is the situation, it means that
a portion of the costs of the system is diffused throughout the
economy by the price mechanism, and thus the final incidence of
the costs is not readily determined. Under such circumstances no
dear picture of the total amount of real income redistribution
brought about by the functioning of the social security system is
obtainable. But even if the above is the actual situation, it is also
true that income and social groups will not necessarily benefit to
the same degree, and it is thus possible to develop a partial picture
of the redistribution of money income within a society. In a general
way the net gain (or loss) experienced by members of an income or
social group as a result of the social security system will be measured
by the ratio of taxes paid to support social security to money benefits received. \Vhile this is not a perfect measure of income redistribution, it is one for which reasonably accurate data can be
obtained, and it does provide a basis for intergroup comparisons.
THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY

The foregoing discussion of income distribution and its modification by the state has stressed not only the theoretical aspects
of the problem, but the quite formidable difficulties pertaining to
the incidence of taxes and benefits that confront anyone attempting
an empirical analysis of income redistribution in a particular society
12

See Chapter 4.
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Because of these things, this study concerns itself with the redistribution of income in France in a limited sense_ Specifically, the
study is limited to an analysis of the redistribution of money income that results from the combined effect of direct taxes on individuals and the receipt of money transfers by individuals_ No
attempt is made to allocate other types of social benefits to specific
groups, nor to allocate the burden of indirect taxation among the
same groups_ In spite of these limitations, it has been possible to
construct a fairly clear picture of the workings of France's social
security system, and to show in particular the extent to which the
system alters the pattern of money income distribution between
social groups and income classes_ 13

13 The social classes treated in this study are farmers; self-employed workers in
areas other than agriculture; wage-earners, including farm laborers; and the nonactive popul:Hion_ The latter includes all persons not actually employed for
wages or salary nor engaged in a business or profession-students, retired persons, members of the clergy, etc. It also includes the population of institutions_
It does not include, of course, the dependents of persons in the first three
categories.
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social security structure largely resulted from
the enthusiasm for sweeping social and economical reform
that characterized the immediate postliberation period. In
1944 the National Council of Resistance issued the so-called "Resistance Charter," which, among other things, demanded a complete
system of social security which would protect the worker against
threats to his livelihood inherent in an industrial society.1 All
of the major French political parties adopted this Resistance
Charter prior to the general elections of October, 1945, and as a
consequence this document became the basis for economic and
social policy in the early days of the Fourth Republic.
Actually the framework for a revamped social security system
was created even before the Charter was issued. In an ordonnance of
October 4, 1945, the Provisional government (the de Gaulle regime)
reorganized the various existing social security schemes into a
general system. 2 This, along with a second ordonnance on October
19, created a unified system for the administration of all social

F

RANCE'S EXISTING

Most of the information in this chapter has been secured directly from
the Ministry of Social Affairs in Paris. Figures given for the monetary value of
the various benefits are those in effect as of June, 1958.
1 This document is reprinted in David Thomson's Democracy in France,
London, 1946, pp. 257259.
• A system of compensation for industrial accidents was first· introduced in
France in 1898. In 1910 an old-age pension system for workers and peasants was
established. In 1930 this legislation was revised and expanded to include social
insurance for illness, invalidity, maternity, old age, and death. The system,
though, was limited to wage-earners whose income did not exceed a certain
ceiling. FamIly allowances were introduced on a limited scale in 1932, and expanded to the Whole population in 1939.
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services, and, equally important, formulated the principle that the
latter should be extended to the whole of the population.3
As is the case in most modern countries, the French system has
two broad objectives: first, it attempts to guarantee all citizens
some minimum standard of material well-being; and, second, it
aims at a more equal distribution of the national income. Beyond
this, France's system has been strongly influenced by the nation's
demographic situation. Prior to 1940 France was faced with a
continuous and increasingly serious decline in the national birth
rate. Fortunately for France's future there has been since 1945 a
sharp reversal of this trend,4 but nevertheless the concern felt by
many French for the gloomy population picture in the interwar
period largely accounts for the significant role that the system of
family allowances occupies in the postwar social security structure.
Another consequence of the prewar demographic situation, and of
the first world war as well, is that there are a disproportionate number of persons, particularly women, in the older age groups. This
necessitates increased aid to the aged through pensions, medical care,
and other forms of assistance. In fact, pre- and postwar demographic
trends have combined to create a population structure in which the
proportion of persons in the highest and lowest ranges of the age
pyramid has sharply increased relative to persons in the middle
ranges, i.e., the active population. In sum, the two major factors
that have largely shaped France's present social security system have
been the postwar demands for social and economic reform and the
nation's demographic problems.
THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN FRANCE

France's social security system appears to be excessively complex,
because there does not exist a single system for the administration of
3 This hl!.s not been realized in practice, for the self-employed participate in
the general system only with respect to family allowances. There is a special
scheme to provide pensions for persons in this social class. See pp. 34-38 in this
chapter.
• In 1920 the birth rate in France was 21.4 (!ler 1,000 inhabitants)" and the
death rate 17.2; in 1930 the birth rate was 18.0 and the death rate 15.6. Bv 1939
the birth rate had fallen to 14.6 and the death rate to 15.3. After the w~r the
birth rate rose to a postwar peak of 20.9 in 1949, and then declined slightly to
18.5 in 1955. The death rate continued to decline, reaching a level of 12.2 in
1955. These changes have brought about an increase in France's population
from 39.8 million in 1940 to 43.4 million in 1956. See Jean-Marcel Jeanneney,
Tableaux Statistiques Telatits Ii l'economie tran~aise etl'economie mondiale
Paris: Armand Colin, 1957, pp. 9, II.
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all social security benefits. The ordonnances of October, 1945,
created a general system (regime general) of social security which
covers about 50 percent of the active population, but alongside
this general system there are a number of special systems, or
schemes, notably for workers in agriculture, mining, and the nationalized industries, and civil servants. Some of these special
schemes were created before the war, and because benefits are higher
in some instances, workers belonging to the special schemes did not
want to have the latter incorporated into the general system. Actually, there is a considerable intermingling of the general and special
systems, for workers in the industries mentioned above do draw
certain benefits from the general system. The discussion which
follows is applicable primarily to the general system; the major
special schemes will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.
The general system embraces three major types of benefits.
These are social insurance proper, the system of family allowances,
and an insurance program for industrial injuries and occupational
diseases. Administration of the system is the responsibility of the
General Director of Social Security, who is a civil servant, and whose
office is a part of the Ministry of Social Affairs. 5

Social Insurance Proper
Social insurance proper covers the risks of sickness and long
sickness, maternity, disability, and old age. Social insurance proper
applies to the whole of Metropolitan France, and to the departements of Guadeloupe, Guyane Fran<,;aise, Martinique, and Reunion
in France's overseas territories. All workers employed under contract of services are covered, irrespective of the amount of earnings
or the nature of the contract. Foreigners employed in France are
entitled to the same benefits as French nationals. At present about
10 million workers, or 70 percent of the wage-earners, are covered
by social insurance proper.
The major features of social insurance proper may be summarized as follows:
1. Sickness Insurance: These benefits involve the refund of
medical expenses (regarded as a benefit in kind by the French
authorities), and the payment of an allowance to compensate for
the loss of earnings during the period of sickness. Persons covered
by sickness insurance are reimbursed for the cost of hospitalization
• The administrative organization of the social security system is discussed
in detail on pages 32-34.
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and drugs and the fees of physicians and dentists in an amount
equal to 80 to 100 per cent of the cost or fee, depending upon the
type of treatment. Physicians and dentists are not, as is the case in
England, employees of the state; a scale of fees is established by
consultation between the social security administration and the
appropriate professional (medical or dental) organization. Medical
practitioners are not legally obligated to observe the scale of fees,
so the actual extent to which a patient can recover the cost outlay
in a particular illness may vary. In practice, the fees charged are
largely in accordance with the income of the patient, as is usually
the situation where the practice of medicine is wholly private.
The allowance paid as compensation for a loss of earnings is
equal to one-half the worker's daily wage, and is paid from the
fourth day following the cessation of work. After the thirty-first
day of illness the allowance may be raised to two-thirds of the
worker's daily wage if the insured worker has at least three dependent children. For ordinary illnesses the allowance is paid for
a maximum period of six months. For long-term sickness-i.e., an
illness that necessitates cessation of work for more than six months
-there are special provisions. In this event the insured worker and
members of his family are entitled to 100 percent reimbursement
for all medical expenses incurred during the period of the illness,
and the payment of the allowance to compensate for the loss of
income continues for a maximum period of three years.
2. Maternity Insurance: These benefits are available to all employed women covered by social insurance proper; they are to be
distinguished from other maternity benefits that are a part of the
system of family allowances and are paid to all women during and
after a pregnancy, irrespective of the fact of employment. Maternity
benefits for employed women include the complete refund of all
medical and hospital expenses incurred as a result of a pregnancy,
although again the reimbursement of these expenses is based upon
a fixed scale of fees. Dependents of the insured are also eligible for
a refund of medical expense they may have incurred as a result of
illness during the insured's pregnancy. The insured is also paid a
daily allowance computed in the same manner as the allowance
for sickness insurance for a period of six weeks before the birth of
the child and eight weeks after the birth. This daily allowance,
however, is paid only on the condition that the insured woman
does not go back to work for at least six weeks after the birth of
her child.
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3. Disability Insurance: Benefits are paid to any person who is
prevented for physical reasons from earning in any trade or profession a wage or salary exceeding one-third of the normal wage or
salary for workers in the same district and in the same occupation
or trade. The insured person is entitled to a complete refund for
all medical expenses arising out of the infirmity that is the cause
of his disability, and is entitled to full sickness benefits for any
other illnesses. The disabled person also is eligible for a pension,
the amount of which is generally equal to 30 percent of his average
annual salary or wage for the ten years preceding his disablement.
If his disablement is total, the pension is increased to 40 percent
of the annual wage or salary, and may be further augmented if
the disabled person requires the constant attention of two persons.
At present the minimum pension for disability is 72,380 francs
($170) per year. 6 The disability pension continues until the beneficiary is 60, and is then replaced by an old-age pension of at least
equal amount. As is the case with all cash benefits paid under the
social security program, the disablement pension is subject to
periodic review, and may be increased in the event of general rise
in the level of wages.
4. Old-Age Pension Insurance: These benefits apply to employed
persons who have attained a prescribed age and meet certain other
conditions. To qualify for a full old-age pension a worker must
have attained the age of 60 and must have been employed for a
period of 30 years in a trade or profession covered by social insurance proper. Under these conditions the worker will receive the
maximum pension, which amounts to 20 percent of the worker's
annual wage or salary for the ten years prior to his retirement.
In the event the insured continues to work after the age of 60 the
pension, when granted, is increased by four percent of the annual
basic wage during every year of employment after the age of 60.
Moreover, the pension may be further increased if the insured has
reared three or more children, and if the insured has a dependent
wife or husband. Persons not eligible for a full pension are entitled to a partial pension, provided they have completed a minimum of 15 years' employment in a covered occupation. The
• The dollar value of the wcial security benefits is determined on the basis
of the existing exchange rate (June, 1958) of 420 French francs to the U. S.
dollar. Since price and consumption patterns differ widely between France and
the United States, the dollar figures give only an approximation of the real
value of the social securi ty benefits.
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amount of the partial pension will be one·half the normal pension
for a person with just 15 years of covered employment, and will
increase proportionately with the actual number of years of covered
employment between 15 and 30.
Since the above provisions were incorporated into French law
by the ordonnances of October, 1945, no workers have fulfilled the
required conditions for a full pension. It may be noted parenthetically that when the full effect of the provisions for old-age pensions
begins to be felt (around 1970), there will be a considerable increase in the transfer of income from the active to the nonactive
population, as the amounts paid for a full pension will be relatively
high. Whether the French economy, in view of the already existing
high level of transfer expenditures, can sustain this augmentation
remains to be seen.
Because the provisions for a full pension are not yet fully in
effect, there exists a supplementary system of allowances for retired
workers (l'allocation aux vieux travailleurs salaries). This latter is
designed to provide old·age pensions for workers who cannot
qualify for the regular pension because of insufficient contributions.
To be eligible for this allowance a worker must have been employed in Metropolitan France for a period of five years after
reaching the age of 50. This period is increased by one year for
each year after 1946, up to a maximum of 15 years. 'Workers who
may not meet these conditions are still eligible for a pension if they
have had employment for 25 years. The pension is granted at the
age of 65, or at age of 60 if the worker is not fit for employment
after this age. It is only granted to a worker if his total income is
less than 201,000 francs ($478) per year, or 258,000 francs ($614) per
year if the applicant is married. The amount of the pension is
72,380 francs ($170) per year for workers living in cities with more
than 5,000 inhabitants, and 68,640 francs ($163) per year for workers
in all other localities, except the Paris region. Workers residing
there are allowed 75,780 francs ($180) per year. As is the case
with the regular pension, the amount paid may be increased if
the worker is married, or has raised more than three children.
5. Death and Survivors Insurance: In the event of the death of
a worker covered by social insurance proper, the system provides
for the payment of a lump sum to the dependents of the insured
worker, and, under certain conditions, payment of a pension to
the widow (or widower) of the deceased. The amount of the lump
sum payment, or "death grant," is equal to three months' salary
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of the deceased worker, except that it cannot exceed a maximum of
150,000 francs ($357). The widow of an insured person is entitled
to a pension if she is permanently disabled and not in receipt of a
pension for old age. A widower incapable of work also receives a
widower's pension if his wife, at the time of her death, had been
the main support of the family. These pensions are only paid if the
applicant is under 60, and the minimum amount of the pension
is 36,]90 francs ($86) per year.

The System of Family Allowances
The most original and most important part of the French social
security structure is the system of family allowances. The system
actually originated before the war, as a decree of July 29, 1939
(Code de la famille), created a comprehensive system of family
allowances for the whole of the active population. 7 The war, however, prevented the Code from coming fully into effect, and after
the war the legislation was revised and the present system came
in to existence. 8
The family allowance system differs from social insurance proper
in that the benefits do not depend upon the actual wage or salary
of the worker, and all benefits are in the form of cash payments.
All persons resident in France, including foreigners employed in
France, are eligible for family allowances, providing, of course,
they satisfy the requirements applicable for each type of benefit.
The amount of the benefits, which are tax free, is determined on
the basis of a standard wage computed for each locality. At present
the standard wage for the Paris region is 19,000 francs (about $45)
per month, and the standard wage for other localities is computed
as a fixed percentage of the standard wage for the Paris region.
The family allowance system consists of the following type of
benefits: (1) family allowances proper; (2) allowances to a single
wage-earner; (3) prenatal and maternity allowances; and (4) a
housing allowance. The chief characteristics of each of these
benefits are described below.
1. Family Allowances Proper: Family allowances proper consist
, Private schemes for family allowances existed in a number of industries in
France before the First World War. In 1932 (law of March 11), a system of
family allowc.nces for wage· earners, financed wholly by employers, was estab·
lished. In 1939 the Code de la Famille extended family allowances to the whole
population.
• Law of August 22, 1946.
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of a monthly cash payment to each family with at least two dependent children. The actual amount of the allowance depends
upon the prevailing standard wage in the locality and the number
of children in the family. For a family with two children it is equal
to 22 percent of the standard wage; for the third and each subsequent child the amount is 33 percent of the standard wage. The
family allowance is normally paid with respect to each child until
the age of 15, or if the child continues schooling after 15, until
the age of 20. For the Paris region the amounts paid monthly
would be as follows:
For
For
For
For

two children - 4,180 francs ($10)
three children - 10,450 francs ($25)
four children - 16,720 francs ($39)
five children - 22,990 francs ($54)

2. Allowances to a Single Wage-Earner: Family allowances
proper are supplemented by the allowance to a single wage-earner
(allocation de salaire unique) which applies to families or households dependent on one source of income from employment, or to
households in which the wage or salary of one of the parents, when
both are employed, does not exceed one-third of the standard wage
for the locality. In this instance the payment is made to a family
with only one dependent child, and the allowance available under
this scheme is added to the amounts paid under family allowances
proper as long as the source of income for the household is as
described above. The amounts paid as a percentage of the standard
wage are: 20 percent for a single child of less than five years of
age; 10 percent for a single child more than five but less than ten
years of age; 40 percent for two children; and 50 percent for three
or more children. For the Paris region the standard wage for the
allowance to a single wage-earner only is fixed at 18,000 francs per
month. A family entitled to both family allowances proper and
the allowance to a single wage-earner would receive the following
amounts monthly:
Number of Children
in the Family

One (younger than 5)
One (older than 5)
Two
Three
Four
Five

Family Allowances
Proper

4,180
10,450
16,720
22,990

($10)
($25)
($39)
($54)

Allowance to a
Single Wage· Earner

3,600
1,800
7,200
9,000
9,000
9,000

($8)
($4)
($17)
($21)
($21)
($21)

Total

3,600
1,800
II,380
19,450
25,720
31.990

($8)

($4~

($3 )
($46)
($60)
($7./)
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There is also a special arrangement for families with more than
three children in which the income of the head of the household
is derived from a nonagricultural, professional activity, and in
which the other parent devotes herself solely to the care of the
children and the household. The sums under this arrangement
are added to the family allowances proper, and are a percentage of
the standard wage equal to 15 percent for three children; 25 percent for four; 40 percent for five; and 50 percent for six or more.
3. Prenatal and Maternity Allowances: These benefits consist of
cash payments to a family during a pregnancy and after the birth
of a child. Prenatal allowances are paid from conception to the
birth of the child, provided the prospective mother submits to three
examinations during the course of the pregnancy, and the amount
is equal to 25 per cent of the standard wage for the locality. This
allowance is separate from the daily allowance paid for women
covered by social insurance proper. The maternity allowance consists of a lump sum payable after the birth of each child. The
amount of this allowance is twice the standard wage for the locality
for the first child, and one and one-third times the standard wage
for each subsequent child. For women over 25, the first birth must
occur within two years of marriage; the second within three years
of the first birth or five years of marriage; and the third within three
years of the second birth, or eight years of marriage. For women
under 25 there are no restrictions on payment of the maternity
allowance.
4. The Housing Allowance: This is a rental grant paid to families that spend a certain proportion of their income for rent, and
live in residences that meet certain minimum conditions of health
and sanitation. The amount of the housing allowance is computed
on the basis of the difference between the actual rent paid by a
family and a minimum standard rent established for various classes
of dwellings and various localities.9 Against this difference a percentage is applied to determine the actual amount paid; the percentage varies with the number of children in a family, ranging
from 40 percent for a young married couple without children to
95 per cent for a family with four or more children. The number
of families that benefit from the housing allowance is relatively
• There also is a ceiling on the actual rent a family may pay in order to benefit from the housing allowance. This ceiling varies with the condition of the
dwelling and the number of children in the family.
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small, partly because of the low level of rents in general, and
partly because such a large proportion of houses and apartments in
France do not meet the minimum standards for health and sanitation. Grants are also paid to persons who undertake expenditures
to improve their dwellings or who move to better their living conditions. These are based on the standard wage, and range from 135
to 220 percent of the latter, depending upon the locality and the
number of children in the family.
Insurance for Industrial Injuries and Occupational Disease
The third facet of the French social security system consists of
an insurance program designed to provide care for the victims of
industrial accidents or occupational disease_lo The coverage of this
program is practically the same as for social insurance proper-i.e.,
all employed persons-except that certain nonemployed persons are
also covered, such as students in technical and vocational schools.
Persons not covered by the legislation may be voluntarily insured
if they register with the local social security office in their area.
Four types of benefits are provided for those eligible under this
program. These are: payments for medical care; a daily allowance
in lieu of wages for temporary incapacity resulting from an industrial accident or occupational disease; an annuity or pension in
the event of permanent incapacity; and annuities for the dependents
of the victim of a fatal accident.
All medical expenses incurred in the treatment of a physical
incapacity resulting from an industrial injury or occupational disease are paid by the social security administration. Unlike the sickness insurance provision of social insurance proper, wherein the
beneficiary must pay the physician himself and be refunded the
prescribed proportion of the costs, the social security administration pays all costs directly to the physician or hospital concerned_
The beneficiary has a free choice of both hospital and physician_
The daily allowance for temporary incapacity is paid from the
first day following the cessation of work. For the first 15 days of
incapacity it is paid on a daily basis, but after this is not payable for
nonworking days. The payment is terminated on the date the
worker returns to full-time employment, or when the disability is
declared permanent. The amount of the allowance is equal to
one-half the worker's daily wage, except that after the twenty-ninth
,. Law of October 30, 1946.
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day of incapacity it is increased to two-thirds of the daily wage.
If .the temporary incapacity lasts more than four months, the
allowance may be reviewed, and possibly increased, if, in the meanwhile, there has been a general increase in wages.
The annuity for permanent incapacity provides a pension for
persons totally or partially disabled as a result of industrial injury
or occupational disease. The amount of the pension depends on
both the degree of disablement of the worker and his annual earnings prior to the injury or illness. In fixing the amount of the
pension, the worker's earnings in the twelve months prior to disablement are used as a base wage, and then against this a somewhat complicated formula is applied to determine the actual pension the worker will receive.l1 Disabled persons requiring the
contant attention of another individual are eligible for a 40 percent increase in the amount of the annuity.
The dependents of the victim of a fatal accident are also entitled to a pension or annuity based upon the annual earnings of
the victim, the latter being computed in the same manner as for a
disability pension. For a widow (or widower) the pension is equal
to 30 percent of the computed earnings, providing the marriage
took place before the accident, and providing, too, that there had
not been a divorce or separation. Children up to the age of 16 are
entitled to an annuity to the extent of 15 percent of the computed
earnings for each of the first two children in the family, and 10
percent for each subsequent child under the age of 16. Grandchildren and parents of the victim are also entitled to an annuity,
provided they were dependent upon the victim. Grandchildren
11 In computing the pension, all the worker's earnings in the prior twelve
months are taken into account only if they do not exceed a prescribed amount.
The portion of the annual wage between 717,746 and 2,870,894 francs counts
only as one· third, and the amount in excess of 2,R70,894 francs is not counted
at all. The wage obtained in this fashion is then multiplied by a percentage
figure computed by counting the degree of disablement under 50 percent at
one-half. and the degree of disablement over 50 percent at one and one-half.
Thus, for a worker with 90 percent disability, the percentage figure would be:
50 + 10 x 3
(25 + 60)
85.
2"
-2-

=

=

If the worker's wage before disablement had been 800,000 francs per
pension would then be computed as follows:
First part ................................................................ ................. ....... 717,746
Second part (Vs of 800,000 less 717,746) ... ........................ 27,418
Total allowed wage
...................... 745,164
Pension equals 85% of 745,164 francs or 633,389 francs.

year, the
francs
francs
francs
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are entitled to the same benefits as the victim's children, while
parents are eligible for an annuity of 10 percent of the computed
earnings. However, the total of annuities paid to grandchildren
and parents cannot exceed 30 percent of the computed earnings,
and, moreover, the total of annuities paid to all dependent'! cannot exceed 75 percent of the latter.
THE FINANCING OF SOCIAL SECURITY

In principle the benefits paid by the general system (regime
general) are financed wholly by contributions from either the employees or employers. In practice this is not the case, as the social
security accounts have been in deficit in recent years. Table I below
shows for the period 1951-55 the proportion of total expenditures
for social security, including the special regimes, covered by the tax
on employees, the tax on employers, and by the general budget.
The latter, of course, measures the deficit of the accounts.
TABLE I

Financing of Social Security Benefits: 1951-55
(in percent)
Means of Finance

1951

1952

1953

1954

19!J5

Taxes on Employees
Taxes on Employers
State Budget (Deficit)

14.9
61.7

16.3
64.3
19.4

16.3
63.3
20.4

15.5
62.1
22.4

15.6
63.1

23.4

2l.!1

Source: Ministere des Finances, Statistiques et Etudes Financieres, No. 85, January, 1956.

Social insurance proper is financed by two taxes, one on the
employer and the other on the employee. The latter pay a tax of
6 percent on the portion of their wages below the ceiling of 600,000 francs ($1,430) per year. The employer's contribution is 10
percent of all wages below this ceiling. The employee's contribution is deducted from his wages by the employer.
The contribution or tax for the system of family allowances is
borne entirely by the employer; the rate at present is 16.75 percent
of the standard wage, which, as already pointed out, varies with
the locality. The contribution of the self-employed varies in
accordance with the individual's net income on the basis of a scale
established by ministerial decree.
Insurance for industrial injuries and occupational disease is
financed wholly by a tax on the business firm; the amount of the
contribution is fixed for each firm by the regional social security
office on the basis of the risks appropriate to each firm. In recent
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years the average rate of contribution has been between two and
three percent of the standard wage. This procedure is supplemented by a system of additional contributions and/or rebates,
designed to meet either exceptional risks in particular firms or
special achievements in the field of accident prevention.
In addition to these three main taxes for the support of social
security. there are certain other charges of a broadly social character
imposed upon the employer. Table II below shows the total of
"social" charges paid by the employer as a percentage of direct
money wages.
TABLE II

Social Security Charges Levied against Employers
as a percent of direct labor costs
Type of Tax

1946

1948

1950

1952

1954

Social Insurance
Family Allowances
Industrial Accidents
Other-

8.8
9.4
3.8
4.9

8.4
12.1
2.8
5.1

8.3
13.2
2.8
5.1

8.7
14.5
3.2
6.4

8.4
14.0
2.3
8.6

26.9

28.4

29.4

32.8

33.3

Total

• Includes an apprenticeship tax, a special tax for the development of workers' housing,
and the cost to the employer of paid vacations, which, in France, is not treated as
a pan of the regular wage hill.
1!<>urce: Institut National de la statistique et des etudes economiques, .ttudes et Conjoncture, No.8, August, 1957.

While the detailed analysis of the transfer burden imposed
on France's economy by the social security system is reserved for
the following chapter, several remarks are in order at this point
with respect to the financing of the system. The data in the above
tables show that the bulk of social security expenditures are largely
financed by the employers, and that the tax burden on the employer
for welfare purposes (Table II) is, for all practical purposes, indirect in character. Employers, in other words, undoubtedly regard
these charges as part of their labor costs, and expect them ultimately to be covered by the prices of goods and services sold.
This means, first, that a considerable portion of the real costs
of social security are rather widely diffused throughout the economy
by ~e price mechanism. As a consequence of this it is probable
that a significant part of the real costs of social security are borne
by beneficiaries of the system in the form of higher prices, although
the general public in France is not much aware of this.
The indirect character of the taxes employed to finance social
security expenditure also means that the impact of the system of
the distribution of real income can be determined only within
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rather narrow limits. The incidence of the benefits of the system
is readily determined, as is the incidence of direct taxes on the
beneficiaries, but the same cannot be said for the incidence of indirect taxation because of the absence of detailed data on consumption patterns for social and/or income classes. At this point
the only safe generalization is that the chief beneficiaries of the
system probably pay enough in additional consumption (Le., in·
direct) taxes to pay for the benefits-money and otherwi5e-they
actually receive.
Finally, it can be argued with considerable conviction that the
charges for social eXPrenditure imposed on the business firm are a
major factor accounting for the relatively higher prices prevailing
in France for consumer goods as compared to other countries in
western Europe. This is not to argue that the level of expenditure
for welfare purposes in France is in any sense "too high." for this
is a question of social values and priorities. but simply to emphasize
that there is a real cost involved in these expenditures, and that
the method chosen to finance them has various repercussions for
the economy. In France the major impact of the latter has been
on the price of consumer goods because of the extent to which indirect taxation is employed as a means of finance. 12
THE ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Administration of the general system (regime general) is the
responsibility of the Minister of Social Affairs, an official of cabinet
rank. Directly beneath him is the General Director of Social
Security, who is a 'Civil servant and responsible for the detailed
operation of the system. Administration is decentralized. as there
are 16 regional directorates in Metropolitan France, the heads of
which exercise powers within each region comparable to the General Director for the whole country. These government departments constitute the essential administrative framework of the
system.
In the actual day-to-day operations of the system the key organizational units are the Caisses (Offices or Funds), which are selfgoverning corporate entities endowed with financial autonomy. In

. 12 Social charges as a proportion of direct labor costs are higher in France
than any other country in western Europe, with the exception of Italy. lnstitut
National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Etudes et Conjuncture,
No.8, August, 1957, p. 879.
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a legal sense all of the Caisses, or funds, with the exception of the
National Social Security Fund (Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale)
have the status of private organizations. They are administered by
elected boards representing both the employees and the employers.13
The essential function of the Caisses is the collection of contributions and the disbursement of benefits for the component parts of
the social security system.
The Caisses form two parallel systems, one of which is devoted
to social insurance proper and insurance for industrial injuries and
occupational disease, and the other to family allowances. These
two fund systems are linked at the national level by the above-noted
National Social Security Fund. The social insurance proper system
consists of, first, 122 local funds (Caisses primaires de Securite
Sociale), which collect all contributions for social insurance proper
and industrial accidents or occupational disease, and administer all
benefits for sickness, maternity, and death, and medical benefits for
temporary incapacity due to industrial injury or occupational disease; and, second, of 32 regional funds (Caisse regionale de
Securite Sociale), which have responsibility for payment of all
old-age pensions and pensions for permanent disability resulting
from industrial injury or occupational disease. Family allowances
are administered through a system of 114 funds (Caisses d'allocations tamiliales), which have responsibility for the collection of all
family allowance contributions, and the payment of family benefits
of all kinds to eligible persons. The National Social Security Fund
has as its main function the allocation of funds among the various
social security and family allowance Caisses so as to insure a
geographical balance of receipts and expenditures.
This formal administrative apparatus is supplemented by the
existence of two unions or federations that function on the national
level as spokesmen for the local or autonomous funds of the system.
There is the National Federation of Social Security Organizations
(La Federation Nationale des Organismes de Securite Sociale) ,
representing the local and regional Caisses, and the National Union
of Family Allowances (L'Union Nationale des Caisses d'Allocations
Familiales), representing the family allowance funds of the system.
,. The local funds for social security proper are administered by a board, of
which three-fourths the membership represents employees and one-fourth employers. The boards that administer family allow:.nces are composed of one-half
representatives of employees, one-fourth representatives of employers, and onefourth representatives of the self-employed.
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These federations are without official or legal status within the
system, but they participate fully in the formulation of public
policy in social security matters as representatives of the multitude
of local funds that are of key importance in the operation of the
system.
In summary, the administration of France's complex social
security system is a three-way affair. Over-all control and direction
rests with the central government through the office of the Director
General of Social Security in the Ministry of Social Affairs, and the
16 regional directorates, but a high degree of decentralization and
local control in actual administration of contributions and benefits
is achieved by the system of autonomous Caisses or funds. The
managers of the local funds have a voice in policy formulation at
the national level through the machinery of the social security
federations.
THE SPECIAL REGIMES AND OTHER FORMS OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE

In addition to the general system, as described in the preceding
pages, there are more than 20 special schemes or regimes that provide social security benefits, but which are limited to wage-earners
in a particular occupation or industry. About 30 percent of French
wage-earners derive their social security benefits from these special
schemes, the most important of which are those for workers in
agriculture, electricity and gas, and the nationalized railroads and
mines, civil servants (including military personnel), and the selfemployed. The rest of the special schemes are of minor importance.
The proportion of wage-earners covered by the general system and
the major special schemes is shown in Table III below.
TABLE III

Proportion of Wage-Earners Covered by Different
Social Security Regimes
Regime

Percent of Wage· Earners

General System
Agricultural Regime
Civil Servants (including Military)
Railroads (S.N.C.F.)
Mines
Local Government
Merchant Marine
Electricity and Gas
Other

69.5
11.5
8.1

3.4
3.1
1.9
0.9
6.9

0.7

Source: La Documentation Francaise. Les Institutions Sociales de la France.
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The special schemes differ from the general system in a number
of respects. For one thing. administrative control is frequently
centered in the ministry appropriate to the industry of which the
scheme is a part. rather than in the office of the General Director
of Social Security. Thus, for example. the Ministry of Agriculture
controls the schemes for workers in agriculture; the Ministry of
Industry and Commerce the scheme for the nationalized mines; and
the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation the scheme for
railroad workers.
Second, there is no uniformity among the special schemes with
respect to the techniques employed to finance the benefits. In
general, workers and employers in the special schemes contribute to
their financing, but frequently to a lesser extent than is the case
with the general system. The special schemes, in some instances,
draw much more heavily on either the resources of the state or the
industry concerned for provision of benefits. Table IV compares
the origin of financial resources for the general system and some of
the more important special schemes. It may be noted in the table
that, in some instances, the rate at which the worker's salary is
taxed is higher in the special schemes than in the general scheme,
but frequently this higher rate applies to fewer benefits, while the
remaining benefits are financed by the state or industry concerned.
Third, there are important differences between the general and
special schemes with respect to the value of benefits available to
the participants. In the special schemes, for example, participants
are usually eligible for retirement benefits at an earlier age than
contributors to the general system, and, too, the amounts received
in the form of a pension are generally higher.
Finally, members of some of the special schemes depend upon
the general system for certain benefits, while the other special
schemes have no ties at all with the general system. In particular,
civil servants receive benefits in kind for illness through the general
system, while employees of the nationalized French electrical and
gas companies have benefits in kind for both illness and industrial
accidents provided by the general system. Students in institutions
of higher learning are eligible for benefits in kind for illness and
maternity, as well as family allowances, through the general system,
although these benefits are financed by subsidy from the central
government.
Particular mention should be made of the schemes for agriculture and the self-employed. In the agricultural sector there is a
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TABLE IV

Origin of Financial Resources for Different
Social Security Regimes
Type of Benefit

General

Sickness (in kind)
Sickness

(cash)

Disablement
Old-Age
Death
Maternity
Industrial Injuries
Family Allowances

Civil

Servants

Regime
Electricity
and Gas

6%-1
lO%-E
6%-1
lO%-E
6%-1
lO%-E

2.5%-1
2.5%-E

1.5%-1
3.5%-E

S

E
6°1-1
,0

6%-1
lO%-E

6%-1

6%-1
lO%-E
6%-1
lO%-E
E
16.75%-E

S
6%-1
6%-1
S
S
S
S

E
O.3%-E
E

Railroads

2.95%-1
E

l\lines Students

2%-1
6%-E
2%-1
E
6%-E
8%-1
E
8%-E
8%-S
6%-1
8%-1
E
8%-E
8%-S
2%-1
E
6%-E
2.95%-1
2%-1
E
6%-E
E
E
E 16.75%-E

S
none
none
none
none

S
none
S

Source: La Documentation Fran~se, Les Institutions Sociales de la France, 1955.
Explanatory note: In the table, financial resources obtained from employees are indicated by I; those obtained from business enterprises (public and private) by E; and
those obtained directly from the state (i.e., subsidies) by S. When a percentage figure
i. given, it indicates the tax rate for social security contributions applied against the
wage or salary. If a percentage is given, followed by an E or S without a percentage
figure, it indicates the

enterprise or state simply contributes an amount to make tip

any deficit, if the latter exists. When several percentage figures are repeated it simply
means that this particular contribution is used to finance several different benefits.

special regime that provides family allowances and the benefits of
social insurance proper for all wage-earners and salaried employees,
including the employees of professional organizations and agricultural cooperatives. Social insurance proper is financed by contributions from both farm owners and/or operators and employees,
while family allowances are financed by a tax on the farm owner
and/or operator and subsidies from the government. The latter,
in recent years, have been the most important source of finance for
family allowances in the agricultural sector,14 Industrial injuries
for workers in agriculture are covered either by private insurance
or insurance through an agricultural cooperative, but in either case
some form of insurance is compulsory. Farm owners and/or operators, like the self-employed in other sectors of the economy, are not
covered by social insurance proper, except for old-age pensions,
but are eligible for family allowances. Since 1952 there has been
in effect a compulsory system for old-age pensions, to which the
H Ministere des Finances, Statistiques et Etudes Financieres, No. 99, March,
1957, pp. 282-285.
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farm owner and/or operator contributes on a scale that varies with
his income.ll; Self-employed persons in agriculture may be insured
on a voluntary basis for illness and maternity.
The self-employed in other sectors of the economy have successfully resisted all efforts to have them included in the general
system of social security,I6 and, except for an old-age pension
scheme, instituted in 1948, they benefit only from the system of
family allowances. Pensions for the self-employed are administered
through autonomous organizations created for each of the following
groups: artisans, which includes all persons following a recognized
handicraft trade; self-employed in industry and commerce; and
self-employed in the liberal professions.
The self-employed in each of these categories pay an annual tax
for financing the old-age pension system, but the amount of the
tax varies considerably both within and as between these categories.
For artisans the tax is fixed by decree at an amount equal to a
certain number of hours of work, each hour of work being established as a value equal to a certain percent of the minimum allowance for retired workers. Recently it has been about 15,000 francs
($36) per year.17 For the self-employed in industry and commerce
there are six tax categories, each of which is related to a given pension sum. The insured can, within the limits of these categories,
choose freely the amount he wishes to contribute each year toward
an eventual pension. These amounts range from 12,000 francs ($28)
to 48,000 francs ($112) per year.1 8 For members of the liberal professions the annual tax is fixed periodically for each profession on
the basis of estimates of the average annual income for the latter.
In 1954 the tax varies from 3,000 francs ($7) to 20,000 francs ($47)
per year. 19
Self-employed persons in each of these categories are eligible at
the age of 65 (60 when disabled) for a basic pension of 32,000 francs
($76) per year, providing their annual income from all sources is
less than 194,000 francs ($461) if single, or 244,000 francs ($580) if

Law of July 10, 1952.
A major reason for this is the unwillingness of the self·employed to submit
to the government accurate information on their incomes, as would be required
if they participated fullv in the system.
17 La Documentation Fran~aise, Les Institutions Sociales de Ie France, Paris,
1955, Vol. l. p. 225.
to Ibid.
10 Ibid.
15

16
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married. Beyond this, the actual pension received is a function of
the total contributions made by the insured prior to retirement.
OTHER WELFARE EXPENDITURES

The welfare expenditures described in the foregoing sections
of this chapter are all made within the framework of France's social
security system, either as a part of the general system or one of the
special schemes. In addition to these expenditures by the social
security organizations, there are several other types of expenditures
for welfare purposes that continue to loom large in the budget of
the central government. These include unemployment compensa·
tion, traditional assistance, and aid to the victims of war. Before
we conclude this chapter, a brief word about each of these is in
order.
In France benefits for loss of work are paid for both total and
partial unemployment. The benefits are administered and paid
by the local community after authorization from the Ministry of
Labor. The system is a noncontributory one, as it is financed
jointly by the central government and the local community. The
financial participation of the latter varies between 5 to 20 percent of the total outlay. For workers totally unemployed the rate
of compensation is between 225 to 330 francs per day for heads
of households, and 100 to 130 francs per day for all others. A
worker may receive compensation for partial unemployment resulting from a temporary shutdown at his place of employment
or for a reduction in the work week below the legal maximum, providing that full unemployment in the establishment has reached
at least 20 percent of the normal work force. The hourly compensation for partial unemployment is 1/80 of the total compensation
the worker would receive in a 14-day period if wholly unemployed.
Traditional assistance includes welfare and charitable e~pendi
tures for such things as aid to the aged and infirm, medical care
for the insane, grants to tubercular persons, and aid to children.
In general, such assistance is directed to persons who, for one
reason or another, are not eligible for benefits or assistance under
the social security programs. Since the war a new form of assistance,
aid to the "economically weak," has appeared. This is for people
with low, fixed incomes who have suffered from the postwar depreciation of the franc. They receive free medical care, reduced
fares for public transportation, and have access to low-cost meals
in restaurants especially organized for their benefit.
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Finally, there are a variety of forms of assistance to war victims
and their dependents. These include not only pensions, but such
things as medical care, homes for the aged and disabled, financial
aid for vocational retraining, scholarships, and the care of war
orphans. There are more than twenty different categories of war
victims eligible for some form of aid.

3 /

Transfer Expenditures in the French Economy

N THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER we discussed in detail the organization
of France's social security system; in this chapter we shall be
concerned with the over-all importance of expenditures for welfare purposes in the economy.
There are two major facets to an analysis of the economic significance of welfare expenditures. First, it is necessary to determine
what portion of the nation's income is being utilized in this way,
for only if this is done will it be possible to reach a judgement about
the "real" costs of the welfare state. And, second, it is essential to
measure-insofar as this is possible-the effect of welfare expenditures upon the distribution of income. The latter is required because one professed objective of the welfare state is an alteration
in the distribution of income. In this chapter we will examine welfare expenditures in France in relation to the national income and
other aggregates, while in Chapter 4 following will be analyzed
the effects of these expenditures upon the distribution of income
in France. In this chapter, too, we shall make a number of comparisons between France, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom
and the United States, on the other, with respect to the magnitude
and significance of welfare expenditures in the respective economies
of these countries.
Before proceeding to the analysis proper, it may be useful to
recall that, generally speaking, expenditures for welfare purposes
have the character of transfers, i.e., they transfer income (real and
monetary) from one group in the economy to another. In Chapter
I transfer expenditures were defined as outlays for which the state
receives no equivalent value in goods or services in exchange. It
may also be recalled that transfer expenditures, while they do not
involve the use of real resources by the government, do reflect, by

I
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and large, the use of government power as an instrument for the
redistribution of income. Thus the magnitude of these expenditures in relation to such aggregates as the national income, personal
income, total government expenditures, etc., serves not only as a
measure of the extent to which a country has become a welfare
state, but also provides a way to measure the real cost to the
economy of welfare activities. In a simple and direct sense the proportion of the national income-i.e., income earned in the process
of production-transferred from group to group through the instrumentality of the government measures both the degree of "welfare statism" and the real cost of the latter to the economy.
NATIONAL INCOME IN FRANCE

We shall begin the analysis by an examination of data on the
national income in France for the prewar year of 1938, and the
postwar years of 1952-55. 1 These data are of interest not only because they serve to underscore the impact of the welfare state upon
the origins of income in France, but also because they reveal a
number of other important structural characteristics of the economy.
The latter, as will be shown, have an important bearing upon the
particular forms that the welfare state apparatus has assumed in
France.
Table V shows (in percent) the factor or functional origin of
the national income. The most important change from prewar has
to do with the share of labor income in the total. As compared to
1938, the labor cost of the national output has risen from 51.7 percent to 58.4 percent in 1955, a relative gain of about 13 percent.
But this relatively larger share of labor income in the national income total has not resulted in a corresponding increase in the
proportion of the national income actually received by workers in
the form of money wages. In fact, the proportionate share of direct
money outlays for wages and salaries declined from 48.5 percent
in 1938 to 46.8 percent in 1955. Thus, the gain experienced by
French wage-earners in the postwar era wth respect to labor's share
of the national income has come about primarily because of a
growth in "social wages"-i.e., social security benefits-rather than
1 The data in all the tables in this chapter are in percent, as the major purpose of the tables is to permit comparisons. These percentage data are derived
from the tables in the appendix, which present the data in absolute amount.
Comments on the major sources for statistical data in France are also found
in the appendix.
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money wages. The social security system has had the effect, in other
words, of boosting the share of labor income in the national income total, but in an indirect fashion. This is also reflected in the
increase of social security taxes (on business firms) from 3.2 percent of the national income in 1938 to 9.3 per cent in 1955.
Several other observations of importance may be drawn from
the data in the table. For one thing, it is evident that France's
economy is still characterized by the existence of large numbers of
small and medium-sized enterprises. This is reflected in the fact
that in 1955, 31.3 percent of the national income still originated
in the activities of unincorporated enterprises, which are, for the
most part, small. 2 France, in other words, is considerably less industrialized than either the United States or the United Kingdom
(see Table IX). In one sense, this means France is less able to
"afford" an extensive system of welfare expenditures because, in
general, real income is a function of the degree of industrialization attained by a nation. This, in conjunction with the difficulties
involved in collecting taxes from many thousands of small business
enterprises, helps explain the preponderant role that indirect taxes
play in France in the financing of both social security and government expenditures in general. The decline in the share of the
national income originating with unincorporated enterprise is a
consequence, in all probability, of the impact of the modernization
plans on the economy.s The only other change of significance to
be noted here is the virtual disappearance of interest as a source
of income. This is a result of the postwar inflation.
The data on personal income and outlay (Table VI) show more
clearly than do the national income data the impact of the welfare
state on the origins of income in France. These data pertain to
money income actually received rather than income earned in the
process of production. The big change to be noted here is the
large increase in transfer payments as a source of personal income
• In 1950, for example, 69.5 percent of all industrial establishments in France
had less than five employees. See Ministere des Finances, Statistiques et Etudes
Financieres, No. 18, 1953, p. 220.
• France's first modernization plan, the Monnet Plan, was put into effect in
1947 and terminated in 1952. The second modernization plan, drafted during
1953, covered the period 1954-57, and the third, for the period 1958-61, is now
in effect. For an evaluation of the impact of planning on France's economic
structure, see the writer's paper, "National Product and Structural Change in
the French Economy," The American Journal ot Economics and Sociology, April,
1957, pp. 251-280.
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TABLE V
National Income in France: 1938, 1952-55
(in percent)
Origin of National Income

Wages and Salaries
Wages and Salaries
Supplements
Social Security Taxes
Total Labor Income
Unincorporated Enterprise
Net Interest
Corporate Income
National Income

1938

48.5
3.2
51.7
36.8
2.2
0.3
100.0

1952

45.8
2.4
8.8
57.0
33.2
- OJ
9.9
100.0

1953

1954

1955

46.7
2.5
9.1
58.3'
31.9
- 0.2
10.0
100.0

46.9
2.4
9.4
58.7
31.3
- 0.2
10.2
"100.0

46.8
2.3
9.3
58.4
31.3
- 0.3
10.6
100.0

and, at the same time, the relative decline in the importance of
factor income in the total picture. In 1935, 90_5 percent of personal
income in France was derived directly from participation in the
productive process, while only 9.5 percent originated from transfer
payments. By 1955, however, the proportion of personal income
derived from transfer payments had risen to 19.3 percent, and the
share of factor income in the total had declined to SO.7 percent.
The data also show there has been a shift in the character of transfers, as income in the form of social security benefits amounted to
14.S percent of the total in 1955, in contrast to only 5.0 percent
in 1935. Transfers in the form of traditional assistance payments
have declined in relative importance. This reflects the fact that
the expanded social security system has increasingly tended to
supplant the older and more traditional forms of assistance.
These data on personal income and its disposition also confirm
what was said previously about changes in the relative importance
of the major sources of income in the economy. Direct wage and
salary payments account for about the same proportion of the
personal income total as they did before the war, while income
derived from the activities of small business (unincorporated enterprise) and interest payments have declined in relative importance.
These changes reflect both a decline in the importance of smallscale enterprise in an absolute sense, and the increasing significance
of transfer payments as a source of personal income for all groups
in the economy. As already pointed out, the decline in the relative
importance of interest income is simply a by-product of inflation.
The data on the disposition of personal income do not show any
startling changes from the prewar pattern, except perhaps in the
matter of taxation. Consumption expenditures and personal savings
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absorb about the same share of the total as in 1938, but there has
been a slight change in the tax figures. The proportion of personal
income going for social security taxes has risen from 0.9 percent
of the total to 2.9 percent in 1955, a development not unexpected in
view of the postwar expansion of the social security system. The
relative decline in the proportion of personal income paid out in
direct-i.e., income-taxes is less easily explained, although it probably reflects the above-mentioned decline in the relative importance
of individual enterprise income in the economy, and the strong
propensity for tax evasion found among the small shopkeepers and
artisans. 4
The tax picture, though, is of particular significance for another
reason. The latter has to do with the relationship between the contributions of individuals to the support of the social security system
and the cash benefits that individuals receive from the system. Here
the picture is particularly interesting, for individuals in the aggregate pay far less in the way of taxes to support the system than
what they draw from the system in the way of benefits. In 1955, for
example, individuals received 19.3 percent of their personal income in the form of various social benefits, but paid out in taxes
only 2.9 percent of their incomes for the direct support of the
system. This relationship stresses again what was said earlier about
the indirect character of the system's financial support. It also helps
explain why in France there is so little awareness of the real costs
to the economy of the social security system.5
It is true that the situation would appear in a more favorable
light if the data were rearranged to include social security taxes
levied against the employer as a part of personal income and then
include these same taxes in the total of social security contributions
by individuals. 1£ this was done with the data for 1952, social benefits would then total 16.1 percent of total income, and social
• According to a Ministry of Finance survey, in the agricultural sector nearly
80 percent of the taxable income is not reported to the tax authorities, while in
commerce and trade the corresponding figure is 28 percent. For the industrial
sector the percentage of fraud in tax returns was estimated to be about 20. See
Ministere des Finances, op. cit., pp. 202, 203. The data in Chapter 4 following
lend additional statistical support to the view that tax evasion is widespread
among the self-employed and farmers.
• During the writer's stay in France this point frequently arose in personal
conversations. In general, the ordinary French citizen approves of the social
security system and its benefits, but he sees little relationship between these expenditures ar.d the prevailing high level of prices in the economy.
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security tax contributions by individuals 9.7 percent of personal
income. A case could be made for this procedure, particularly for
France, because "social wages" do loom large in the personal income position of the average citizen. But at best it is not a strong
case. Realism demands that personal income be computed on the
basis of money income actually received by persons, and thus it is
neither reasonable nor desirable to include in this total employer
contributions to social security, even though these outlays eventually appear as one form of personal income received. The objective
here is to show the sharp postwar increase in social benefits as a
source of personal income, and this objective would be distorted
if the above procedure was followed. Moreover, from the point of
view of assessing the real cost and incidence of the social security
system in the economy, it would clearly be a mistake to treat employer social security contributions as a direct tax, the incidence
of which is on the employee. Realism requires that these taxes be
treated as a part of the employer's total labor costs, which are,
sooner or later, reflected in the final price of goods and services
sold.
TABLE VI

Personal Income and Outlay in France: 1938, 1952-55
(in percent)
Sources of Personal Income
Wages and Saf!ries
Unincorporated Enterprise
Interest
Dividends
Abroad (net)
Total Factor Income
Transfer Income
Social Securi ty
Supplements
Assistance
'Var Damages
Total Transfer Income
Personal Income
Personal Outlay
Consumption
Taxes
Income
Social Secu ri ty
Total
Savings
Personal Income

1938

1952

45.6
34.6
6.9
3.4

45.3
31.4
1.0
3.4
1.0

45.9
30.2
0.8
3.5
0.8

45.9
29.2
1.0
3.5
0.8

90.5

82.1

81.2

80.4

5.0

11.2
2.4
2.9
1.4

11.9
2.4
3.2
1.3

12.7
2.4
3.1
1.4

4.5

1953

45.9
29.5
0.9
3.6
0.8

-80.7

12.5
2.3
3.2
1.3

--

100.0

100.0

100.0

87.0

87.6

86.4

85.5

2.3
2.6

2.9
2.9

2.4
2.9

4.9
8.1

5.8
6.6

2.6
2.9
5.5
8.1

--

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

17.9

18.8

100.0

86.8
4.2
0.6

100.0

19;",;)

--

--

9.5
100.0

4.8
8.4

1954

--

19.6

19.3

5.3
9.2
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Our conclusion at this point is simply that there is, in the
aggregate, little relationship between what the French citizen pays
directly in taxes to support the social security system, and what he
receives from the same system in the form of cash benefits that
augment his personal income. In theory, the French system, as was
pointed out in Chapter 2, is wholly self-financed, either by contributions from the beneficiaries or by contributions from the employer. In practice, though, such is hardly the case because of the
small proportion of direct money benefits that are financed by direct
taxation. The actual pattern is one of dependence on indirect
taxation, with a consequent diffusion of the real costs of the system
throughout the economy via the price mechanism. Under such
circumstances there may be a considerable unplanned transfer of
real income between social groups in the economy, although the
magnitude of the latter is not easily measured. If the above is true,
it also follows that there is no assurance that the system is necessarily
progessive with respect to both the incidence of its costs and benefits.
SOCIAL EXPENDITURE IN THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS

The place that social security or welfare expenditures occupy in
France's economic structure can be viewed from another perspective
if we examine the aggregate of such expenditures in relation to the
expenditure total of the government for its current operations and
also the major tax sources for the latter's revenue. This is done in
Tables VII and VIII, which show (in percent)·the current expenditures of the government (including local government) for
1938 and the period 1952-55, and the major source of tax revenue
for the same years. These data are also useful because they provide
additional insight into important structural characteristics of the
economy.
In Table VII government expenditures are presented in four
major categories. These are: government consumption, or purchase
of goods and services; net interest; transfer payments to individuals;
and transfer payments to business firms. These four categories
represent the total of French government expenditures for current
operations, but they do not include certain other outlays that have
a prominent place in the budget of the central government. These
latter include, first, capital expenditures by the government, which,
in French national income accounting, are included in the figure
for gross domestic investment; and, second, lending operations by
the central government vis-a-vis both the private and public sectors
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of the economy.6 There is considerable logic in the French practice
of treating capital expenditures by the government as a part of
gross domestic investment-this may be contrasted to the U. S.
procedure of treating these outlays as part of current government
expenditure-and in the analysis which follows, this distinction between current and capital operations by the government has been
retained. The validity of this distinction lies in the fact that it
enables us to obtain a clear picture of the current operations of
the government, as respects both transfers and the public consumption of goods and services. This, then, enables us to see clearly
what proportion of both income earned in production-i.e., the
national income-and the total real output is being utilized for
the activities of the government. The reader is warned, however,
that it is not possible to obtain a satisfactory idea of the over-all
financial position of the French government from the accounts for
the latter's current operations.7 This is because tp.e aforementioned
capital and lending operations are not included in the current
account for the government sector.
In Table VII the postwar growth of the welfare state is reflected in the shift in the relative position occupied by government consumption and transfer expenditures in the over-all total
of current government outlays. Since 1938 government expenditures devoted to the purchase of goods and services for the more
or les!) traditional governmental functions have declined from 48.3
percent of the total to 44.5 percent in 1955. Correspondingly, the
share of transfer expenditures in the total rose from 51.7 percent
in 1938 to 55.5 percent in 1955. The data for the period 1952-55
show that a trend in this direction has continued to manifest itself
in the postwar economy, for in these years the share of government
consumption in the total continued to decline, while tranfers rose
accordingly. Thus, tranfer activities have tended to absorb an increasingly larger proportion of the government's resources being
devoted to current operations. Whether or not this trend will
continue in the future cannot be determined for certain, but the
probabilities are in favor of its continuation simply because the
• During the period 1947-52, for example, 45 percent of investment expendi.
ture (private and public) carried out in accordance with the objectives of the
modernization plan was financed by the central government.
7 During the period 1952-55 the deficit for the central government finances
averaged about 650 billion francs per year. This is roughly the equivalent of
$1.5 billion per year.
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full economic effects of France's welfare state will not be felt until
about 1970. In Chapter 2 it was pointed out that the old-age pension system will not become fully effective until around 1970, and
this, in conjunction with continued pressure for improved benefits,
will undoubtedly increase the proportion of government outlays
devoted to welfare purposes.s Whether or not the French state can
manage this without drastic financial reform and in view of its
commitments to the European common market is problematical.
The impact of the welfare state on the structure of French
government expenditures is better seen if we examine the three
major categories of tranfer expenditures. The increase in aggregate
transfers from 51.7 percent of total outlays in 1938 to 55.5 percent
in 1955 does not tell the whole story because of the rather drastic
shift in the composition of these tranfers. In 1938, for example,
interest on the public debt was a major transfer item, as it accounted
for 15 percent of all government outlays. But by 1955 this item
had become of relatively little significance, for then it represented
only 2.9 percent of total government expenditure. The postwar
inflation is, of course, the major explanation for this shift. The
effects of the social security system are seen most clearly in the data
pertaining to transfers to individuals. Outlays for social security
rose from 15.0 percent of the total in 1938 to 30.2 percent in 1955,
a relative increase of about 100 percent. At the same time expenditures for traditional assistance declined from 14.2 percent
of total outlays in 1938 to 7.8 percent in 1955. War-damage indemnities, an item that did not exist in 1938, account for the
balance of the increase in transfers to individuals. The balance
sheet for all these items shows an increase in welfare transfers to
individuals from 30.0 percent of total government expenditures in
1938 to 41.4 percent in 1955.
The idea implicit in the above comments that the welfare state
is, in the main, responsible for the relative increase in transfer expenditures in the government account is supported by the data
pertaining to transfers to business firms. In general, there has not
. been any significant increase in subsidies to business since 1938.
True, the total of transfers to business has risen from 6.7 percent

SIn connection with this it should be noted that a complete integration of
the approximately nine million Moslems in Algeria into the economic and social
structure of Metropolitan France would impose a new and staggering transfer
burden on France's social security system.
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of government outlays in 1938 to 11.2 percent in 1955, but this
gain is largely accounted for by payments of war-damage indemnities, again an item that did not exist before the war. The total of
subsidies to business rose only slightly, from 8.3 percent in 1938
to 9.5 percent in 1955.
In sum, then, the postwar expansion of the social security system
has brought about significant changes in the structure of current
government expenditures in France. There has been an appreciable
increase in the proportion of the government's resources devoted
to welfare payments to individuals, and a relative decline in the
proportion of resources being devoted to the state's traditional
functions, as well as in transfers to individuals in the form of interest on the public debt. Transfers to business firms have undergone only minor modifications.
TABLE VII

Government Expenditures in France: 1938, 1952-55
(in percent)
1938

Government Consumption
Goods and Services
29.2
19.1
'Vages and Salaries
Total Consumption
48.3
15.0
Net Interest
Transfers to Individuals
15.8
Social Securi ty
14.2
Assistance
War Damages
Total to Individuals
30.0
Transfers to Business
Subsidies
8.3
War Damages
Less: Current surplus of
Government enterprise
- 1.6
Total to Business
f0
51.7
Total Transfers
100.0
Total Expenditures

1952

-

1953

1954

1955

20.6
29.5
50.1
2.7

20.1
29.2
49.3
2.3

18.4
28.4
. 46.8
2.7

16.6
27.9
44.5
2.9

26.6
7.0
3.3
36.9

27.3
7.2
3.1
37.6

29.6
7.3
3.1
40.0

30.2
7.8
3.4
41.4

7.4
3.2

8.6
2.7

8.8
2.3

9.5
2.3

0.3

IO:3
49.9
100.0

-

0.5
10.8
50.7
100.0

-

0.6
10.5
53.2
100.0

-

0.6
11.2
55.5
100.0

Data on the sources of tax revenue for the public sector are
contained in Table VIII. In this table the data are arranged in two
different ways so as to bring out as clearly as possible the more
significant characteristics of France's tax structure. In the first part
of the table taxes are grouped according to the conventional categories of direct taxes, indirect business taxes, and social security
\ taxes. But in the second part the data are rearranged so as to
classify the taxes on the basis of their presumed incidence. That is,
they are grouped according to whether the tax is borne directly
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by individuals, indirectly by individuals through higher prices for
consumption goods and services, or by business firms. Analysis of
the tax data in these two ways permits us to distinguish readily the
impact of the welfare state on France's revenue system.
The most striking characteristic of France's tax structure is the
extent to which the state is dependent upon indirect taxation for
its revenues. In 1955, for example, indirect business taxes accounted
for 54.8 percent of the government's tax revenue. If we add to this
figure the social security contributions of the business firm-which
are, as is argued in this study, another form of indirect taxationthe amount then becomes 76.8 percent of the total tax revenue.
The converse of this, of course, is the relatively insignificant role
played by direct taxation. Again in 1955 the personal income tax
was responsible for only 6.2 percent of the government's revenue.
The total of income taxes on both individuals and business firms
yielded but 15.9 percent of total tax income, and even if we add
to this the social security taxes paid by individuals the total becomes only 23.2 percent.
Since 1938 the tax structure has undergone certain modifications,
TABLE VIII

Revenue from Taxation in France: 1938, 1952-55
(in percent)
1938

1952

1953

1954

1950

Part 1
Direct Taxes
Individuals
Firms
Total Direct Taxes
Indirect Business Taxes
Social Security Taxes
Individuals
Firms
Total Social
Security Taxes
Total Tax Revenue

19.7
4.9
24.6
60.5

6.2
9.7
15.9
56.4

6.9
10.7
17.6
54.9

6.5
9.7
16.2
55.3

6.2
9.7
15.9
54.8

2.6
12.3

6.5
21.2

7.1
20.4

7.1
21.4

7.3
22.0

14.9
100.0

27.7
100.0

27.5
100.0

28.5
100.0

29.3
100.0

Part 11
Taxes on Individuals
Income
Social Securi ty
Total Taxes on
Individuals
Taxes on Consumption
Indirect Business Taxes
Social Security (Firms)
Total Taxes on
Consumption
Taxes on Business
Total Tax Revenue

19.7
2.6

6.2
6.5

6.9
7.1

6.5
7.1

6.2
7.3

22.3

12.7

14.0

13.6

13.5

60.5
12.3

56.4
21.2

54.9
20.4

55.3
21.4

54.8
22.0

72.8
4.9
100.0

77.6
9.7
100.0

75.3
10.7
100.0

76.7
9.7
100.0

76.8
9.7
100.0
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primarily as a result of the expansion of the social security system.
In Part I of Table VIII it can be seen that both direct taxes (income
taxes on individuals and firms) and indirect business taxes have declined in relative importance as a source of tax revenue. In 1955
direct taxes accounted for 15.9 percent of all tax revenues as
against 24.6 percent in 1938, while indirect business taxes totaled
54.8 percent of revenue in 1955 as contrasted to 60.5 percent in
1938. This shift in the relative importance of these two tax categories is due to the increased importance of social security taxation,
both for firms and for individuals. In 1955 social security taxes accounted for 29.3 percent of all government tax revenue as compared to 14.9 percent in 1938, a relative change of about 96 percent.
Social security taxes levied against business firms rose from 12.3
percent of revenue to 22.0 percent between 1938 and 1955, while
the contributions of individuals increased from 2.6 percent to 7.3
percent in the same period. Thus, the enlarged emphasis upon
welfare expenditures in France's postwar economy has made social
security taxes more important than income taxes as a revenue
source. This is a reversal of the prewar situation. The other change
of importance from the prewar situation to be noted is the larger
role assumed by the taxation of the income of business firms. In
1955 such taxes were 9.7 percent of the total tax revenue, and only
4.9 percent in 1938. This is a consequence of the introduction of
a corporation income tax in 1948. It probably reflects, too, the more
industrialized status of France's economy in 1955 as compared to
prewar. The modernization plans have accelerated somewhat the
trend toward larger establishments.
The extent to which France's revenue system is geared to indirect taxation results from the combination of a number of circumstances. It derives fundamentally from the well-known aversion of the French for direct taxation. In its worst form this leads
to outright tax evasion, a practice long recognized to be widespread
among the owners of small enterprises. This hostility to direct taxation in combination with the exceedingly heavy financial commitments of postwar governments for reconstruction and modernization has forced the state to rely increasingly on indirect taxation.
To these things has been added the heavy burden of welfare expenditures that require the state to transfer a large portion of the
national income from group to group. Under these circumstances
it is doubtful if any government, let alone the relatively feeble
regime of France's Fourth Republic, could impose on its citizens
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direct taxes in the amount necessary to meet such a burden of
commitments. Of course the real costs are there, irrespective of
the system of finance, but indirect taxation has the dubious virtue
of concealing these real costs from the great majority of citizens.
The data already presented pertaining to the public finances of
France, as well as data to be presented later in this chapter pertaining to welfare expenditures in the United Kingdom, lead the writer
to offer the following observations with respect to both the real
costs and the techniques of financing the welfare state. There can
be little doubt that the modern welfare state imposes a relatively
heavy burden of transfer expenditures on the central authority.
Granted this, and in view of the increasingly heavy commitments of
modern governments in other areas, it is submitted that it is
illusionary to believe that these outlays can be wholly financed by
direct taxation. In the early formulation of the welfare state concept, particularly in the United Kingdom, the idea existed that it
would involve essentially taking from the "classes" and giving to the
"masses." This simplified view of the way in which the welfare
state can be financed is, in the economic sense, an illusion, even
though politically it remains an idea of considerable potency. This
is not to be construed as an argument against the expansion of
welfare activities by the government, for this is a question having
to do with basic social objectives and values, but it is, in a sense,
a plea for realism in recognizing some of the economic implications
of these activities. The thesis advanced here is, essentially, that an
enlargement of the state's welfare activities via the mechanism of
transfer expenditures must inevitably, under modern conditions,
entail a significant increase in indirect taxation with consequent
price and income effects that cannot be readily determined. France's
experience supports this view, for the tax burden thrust upon the
business firm is a major factor in boosting French prices above competitive levels in world markets. 9 This, in turn, has aggravated
France's balance of payments problem.
TRANSFER EXPENDITURES AND TAXATION IN THE ECONOMIES OF
FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES

In the foregoing sections of this chapter we analyzed welfare
expenditures in France in relation to the national income, personal
• The noncompetitive character of French prices in world markets is well
documented in the so-called Nathan report. See Commission pour l'etude des
disparites entre les prix franl,;ais et etrangers, Rapp01"t General, Paris, 1954.
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income, government expenditure, and taxation. In this section
comparisons will be made between France, the United Kingdom,
and the United States with respect to both the magnitude of welfare
expenditures and the uses of national product in the respective
economies of all three countries. The purpose of these comparisons
is, first, to underscore structural difference between the economy of
France, on the one hand, and the economies of Britain and the
United States, on the other; and, second, to measure the relative
significance of welfare expenditures in the economies of each of
these countries.1° This study is concerned primarily with the welfare state in France, but comparisons along the lines indicated
above will contribute to an understanding of the way in which the
welfare state functions within the French economy.
TABLE IX

Gross National Product and Expenditure in
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States: 1952
(in percent)
France

Sources of GNP
Personal Consumption
Gross Domestic Investment
Government Consumption
Net Foreign Investment
Gross National Product
Allocations of GNP
Employee Compensation
Unincorporated Enterprise
Corporate Income
Other Property Income
National Income
Indirect Business Taxes
Business Transfer Payments
Statistical Discrepancy
Less: Subsidies Minus Current
Surplus of Government Enterprise
Net NatIOnal Product
Capital Consumption Allowances
Gross National Product

United Kingdom

United States

66.8
18.9
16.2
- 1.9
100.0

66.9
13.8
18.3
1.0
100.0

62.7
15.1
22.3
- 0.1
100.0

43.2
25.2
4.9
2.5

57.7
8.6
8.5
4.1
78.9
14.5

55.5

75.8
16.9
0.2

0.8

-

3.3
89.6
lOA
100.0

-

11.8

11.6
4.9
83.8
8.1
0.3
0.1

2.1
91.8
8.2
100.0

10 The data for 1952 are used as the basis for comparison between the three
countries primarily because 1952 is the most recent year for which accurate data
are available on the internal distribution of income in France (see Chapter 4).
It was also a year relatively free of strong inflationary pressures in all the countries concerned. Actually it does not matter a great deal whether the comparison
is made on the basis of the data for 1952 or a subsequent year, because postwar
welfare institutions had largely become stabilized by 1952, and have not undergone any significant changes in France, Britain, or the United States since that
lime.
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Table IX contains data (in percent) on the origins and disposition of the gross national product l l in France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. With respect to the sources of
the GNP-i.e., the major categories of expenditure in the economy
-there are no extremely important differences in the economies of
these countries. In France, gross domestic investment is somewhat
higher than in either Britain or the United States, but government
consumption is slightly lower. Actually, the proportion of total
output being directed to both government consumption and gross
investment is about the same in all three countries. The point in
this is that public activity in France does not absorb a greater
proportion of the economy's real output than do similar activities
in the United Kingdom and the United States. The real "burden"
of government on the economy is measured by the proportion of
real output-i.e., GNP-absorbed by the public sector for its purposes. In national income accounting practice this is equal to
government consumption, or the government's purchase of goods
and services. It is true, of course, that the "burden" of government is particularly heavy in France when viewed from the perspective of total government outlays, but this has not come about
because the government in France attempts to carryon more functions of a kind that utilize real resources than is done in either the
United Kingdom or the United States. Rather, it has come about
because of the volume of transfer expenditures that has been thrust
on the public sector in France. 12
When we turn to the data on the allocation of the GNP, we
find several interesting differences between the economy of France
and those of the United Kingdom and the United States. The
allocations side of the GNP data is important because it constitutes,
in effect, a measure of the "cost" to the economy of the total output realized in a particular period. The three major categories of
"cost" that make up the allocations side of the GNP are factor
Hereafter the gross national product will be referred to as GNP.
The re2der may wonder about the treatment of nationalized industry, as
nationalization is more extensive in both Britain and France than it is in the
United States. In national income accounting practices. nationali7ed industries
are considered as a part of the business sector, just as is private enterprise. Hence
the existence of nationalized industries does not enlarge the role of the public
sector with respect to the proportion of the economy's resources absorbed by
the latter f01 its purposes. If nationalized industries are suhsidi7en. hv the state,
this will appear in the national accounts as transfer e.xpenditures by the government, and will differ in no wa), from subsidies to the private sector.
11

12
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costs, or the total of payments made to factor owners to secure the
services of economic resources for the production period in question; indirect business taxes, which are a part of the cost of the
national output on the assumption that these taxes will be reflected in the price of final goods and services; and capital consumption allowances, which reflect the contribution of existing capital
instruments to current output. An analysis of the allocations side
of the GNP reveals much meaningful information about the economic and industrial structure of a country.
The point was made earlier in this chapter that France is less
industrialized than either the United States or the United Kingdom.
The data in Table IX support this contention, for as a general
proposition the more industrialized a nation is, the greater will
be the proportion of the national income (or GNP) allocated to
labor and corporate income. This simply reflects the fact that the
process of industrialization brings about a concentration of production in larger units, with a consequent growth in the number
of wage and/or salaried employees and a corresponding decline in
the importance of self-employment. Thus the cost allocation of
the national income (or GNP) among the factors of production
provides us with a set of clues to evaluate the extent of industrialization in a country.
On the basis of this criterion France is clearly less of an industrial nation than either the United Kingdom or the United States.
Data in the table show that in France only 43.2 percent of the GNP
is accounted for by compensation of employees-i.e., wage and
salary payments-as compared to 67.7 percent in the United Kingdom and 55.5 percent in the United States. On the other hand,
income accruing to the owners of individual enterprises is proportionally much greater in France than in the other two nations.
In France income in this form totals 25.2 percent of the GNP in
contrast to 8.6 and 1l.S percent in Britain and the United States,
respectively. Corporate income, as one would expect, is of relatively greater importance in the British and American economies.
What conclusions, then, can be drawn from the data at this
point? To the extent that France is less an industrial state than
either Britain or America, it means, in a sense, that France is less
able to "afford" an extensive system of social security than either
of the other two countries. Why is this so? It is so, first, because
in a general way real income per capita is a function of the degree
of industrialization attained by a nation, and, second, it follows
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that what a nation can "afford" in the way of social benefits is,
again in a broad sense, a function of the real income of its people.
The latter is the case simply because the welfare state requires
extensive transfers of income, and the extent to which this can
be done successfully will be limited by the level of real income
actually existing in a country. A poor country, in other words,
cannot afford to indulge in income transfers on a large scale simply
because there will be for the mass of its citizens very little income
in excess of what is necessary to provide a bare subsistence standard
of living. France, of course, is not poor in this sense, but since its
real income is below that of both the United Kingdom and the
United States,l3 the French economy is in a less favorable position
to support large outlays for welfare purposes. Once again, this
is not to be construed as an argument against welfare expenditures
as such, but simply as recognition of the fact that the level of real
income is of crucial importance with respect to the means employed
to finance the welfare state. It is argued here as a general principle
that the lower the level of real income, the less possible it becomes
to resort to direct taxation as a means of finance for welfare expenditures. A practical consequence of this is that the beneficiaries.
of the welfare state will, in all probability, pay indirectly for most
of its costs through higher prices for the goods and services they
consume.
Two other differences between France and the economies of
Britain and the United States may be noted on the basis of the
data in Table IX. First, indirect business taxes absorb a larger
portion of France's GNP than is true in either the United Kingdom
or the United States. The difference between France and the United
Kingdom is not especially large, but the contrast between France
and the United States in this respect is quite significant. This, it
would seem, supports the thesis already advanced about the inevitability of indirect taxation in a welfare state setting, as both
France and the United Kingdom have gone further in this direction
than has the United States. Second, capital consumption allowances
absorb a larger proportion of the GNP in France than in either of
the other two countries. This is a consequence of the greater aver-

13 In 1955, according to a recent study of the OEEC, the per capita GNP in
the United States was $2,310, that of the United Kingdom $1,470, and that of
France $1,255. See Milton Gilbert, Comparative Natiollal Products and Price
Levels, OEEC, Paris. 1957.
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age age of industrial plant in France as compared to Britain and
the United States, and has meant for France a somewhat lower rate
of net investment, a fact which indirectly affects the country's rate
of economic growth. 14
The data on personal income and outlay provide additional
evidence of important structural differences in the economies of
the three countries. These data are contained in Table X. The
major difference to be noted here is the much greater importance
in France of transfer payments as a source of personal income than
is true for Britain or America. The relative importance of transfer
payments as a source of personal income is a good measure of the
degree of "welfare statism" existing in a nation because, in general,
these payments are transfers made for welfare purposes. On the
basis of this criterion it can be argued that France is more of a welfare state than either the United Kingdom or the United States.
In France 17.9 percent of personal income is derived from transfer
expenditures whereas in the United Kingdom the corresponding
figure is 7.4 percent, and for the United States it is but 4.7 percent.
TABLE X

Personal Income and Outlay in France,
the United Kingdom, and the United States: 1952
(in percent)
France

Sources of Personal Itlcome
Wages and Salaries
Unincorporated Enterprise
Other Property Income
Total Factor Income
Transfer Income
Total Personal Income
Personal Outlav
Consumption
Taxes
Income
Social Security
Total
Savings
Total Personal Income

United Kingdom

United States

45.3
31.4
5.4
82.1
17.9
100.0

69.9
11.1
11.6
92.6
7,4
100.0

68.9
15.0
11.4
95.3
4.7
100.0

87.0

86.0

79.8

2.3
2.6

9.6
3.9
13.5
0.5
100.0

12.7
1.4
14.1
6.1

4.9
8.1
100.0

Ioo.O

The data in this table also support prior observations about the
less industrialized status of France. That is, wages and salaries
,. Commissariat General du Plan, Rapport sur Ie plan de modernisation et
d'iquipement de I'Union franfaise, Paris, 1949, pp. 9, 10.
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account for a smaller proportion of the personal income total in
France than they do in Britain and the United States, while income
derived from unincorporated enterprises is of much greater relative
importance in the French economy. Thus both the GNP and the
personal income data reveal, on the one hand, that France is less
industrialized than Britain or America, and, on the other, that
transfer or welfare expenditures are of considerably greater significance as a source of personal income in France than is the case
in the other two nations.
The data in Table X pertaining to the disposition of personal
income are of interest because of the way in which they reveal a
sharp contrast between the tax burden assumed by the French
citizen and that assumed by his British and American counterparts.
In the United Kingdom and the United States direct taxes on individuals, including social security taxes, take about the same proportion of personal incomes, the figures being 13.5 and 14.1 percent
for Britain and the United States, respectively. In France, however, direct taxes are equal to only 4.9 percent of the personal
income total. With respect to the personal income tax alone, the
differences are even more pronounced, as in France this tax amounts
to but 2.3 percent of personal income as compared to 9.6 percent
in the United Kingdom and 12.7 percent in the United States.
Social security taxes levied against the individual are, it is true,
relatively higher in France than in the United States, but are less
than those in effect in Great Britain. If we compare the relationship between transfer income received and social security taxes
paid, the following figures emerge: in France direct taxes paid by
individuals for the support of social security are equal to 14.5 percent of benefits received; for Britain this ration is 52.7 percent; and
for the United States it is 3l.8 percent. Thus it appears that it is
in the United Kingdom that the beneficiaries of the social security
system contribute the most to the direct support of the system. In
France, on the other hand, the direct participation by the beneficiaries in this sense is least. In sum, the French consumer is better off than his British or American counterpart in the matter of
the direct taxation of his income, but this more favored position is
largely illusionary, once we take into account the effect of indirect
taxation on his real income. This point will be developed further
in conjunction with discussion of the data contained in Table XII.
In Table XI a comparison is made between government receipts
and current expenditures in the countries under discussion. These
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data permit us to see in yet another perspective the role that welfare expenditures play in the economies of the three countries. They
also point up significant differences in their tax structures. With
respect to taxation, the greatest difference between the three countries has to do with the relative importance of direct taxation-i.e.,
taxation of the income of firms and individuals-as a source of
government revenues. The United States depends the most upon
direct taxes for its revenues, as the latter were equal to 58.4 percent of current government expenditures in 1952. The situation in
France is in sharp contrast to this, for here direct taxes account
for only 14.7 percent of government expenditure. The corresponding figure for the United Kingdom is 36.5 percent. On the other
hand, indirect business taxes and social security taxes levied against
both firms and individuals are of relatively greater import in both
France and Great Britain than they are in the United States. It
should be noted, too, that social security taxes levied against the
business firm are of relatively greater weight in the French tax
structure than they are in either the United Kingdom or the United
States.
''''hat conclusions can be drawn from these data? For one thing,
the data in this table underscore further what has been said about
the essentially indirect character of France's tax structure. The
comparison with Britain and the United States simply makes this
characteristic even more glaringly obvious. Second, the data lend
support to the thesis advanced earlier that under modern conditions
the growth of the welfare state leads to an increased dependence
by government upon indirect taxation as a source of revenue. On
the basis of our adopted criteria for the degree of "welfare
statism"-i.e., the relative importance of transfer expenditures in
the various national accounts-both France and Britain are more
nearly welfare states than is the United States. And in both the
former countries indirect taxation, including the social security
taxes levied against the employer, is of greater relative significance
than it is in the United States. In France, it is true, this situation
is due partly to the French citizen's basic hostility toward direct
taxation in any form, as well as outright fraud and evasion, but
important as these factors may be they are not sufficient to account
for the very great difference that exists between France and the
United States in this respect. In the United Kingdom, moreover,
the personal income tax is comparable to the American tax as
respects progression in rates, and furthermore Britain, unlike

60

/

The Welfare State in France

France, does not have a serious problem of tax evasion. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a direct relationship between the expansion of welfare expenditures and the growth
in the relative importance of indirect taxation in the over-all
revenue structure. In this connection it is useful to recall that the
data in Table IX indicate that there are no significant differences
in the economies of the three countries with respect to the proportion of the national output absorbed by the public sector for what
we have termed the traditional functions of government. The
significant differences that exist are in the sphere of transfer expenditures.
TABLE XI

Government Receipts and Expenditures in
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States: 1952
(in percent)
France

Government Receipts
Direct Taxes
Individuals
Firms
Total
Indirect Business Taxes
Social Security Taxes
Individuals
Firms
Total
Total Tax Revenue
Other Revenue
Total Revenue
Deficit (+) or Surplus
Total Expenditure
Government Expenditure
Goods and Services
Transfers
Net Interest
to Individuals
to Business
Total Transfers
Total Expenditure

(-)

United Kingdom

United States

36.6
21.8
58.4
29.7

5.6
9.1
14.7
52.1

27.3
9.2
36.5
46.8

6.1
19.5
25.6
92.4
5.4
97.8
2.2
100.0

9.8
10.7
20.5
103.8
8.0
111.8
- 11.8
100.0

50.1

59.2

82.1

2.7
36.9
10.3
49.9
100.0

14.5
18.6
7.7
40.8
100.0

5.2
12.6
0.1
17.9
100.0

4.0

3.9

7.9
96.0
96.0
4.0
100.0

This last observation is confirmed by the data in Table XI pertaining to current government expenditures in the three countries.
In the United States government consumption accounts for 82.1 percent of total government expenditure. In the United Kingdom
and France, on the other hand, transfer expenditures are of much
greater relative significance. In France transfers account for practically half of all current expenditures, while in Britain they repre-
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sent about two-fifths of total outlays. The contrast between the
three countries is greatest with respect to transfer payments to
individuals, for in France these payments equal 36.9 percent of
total government expenditures, as compared to 18.6 percent in the
United Kingdom, and 12.6 percent in the United States. For the
United States and Britain interest on the public debt remains a
transfer item of importance, although this is not true of France.
In France and the United Kingdom, in contrast to the United
States, subsidies to business firms are a major transfer expenditure,
although again this item is of greater import in France.
This analysis of the relative importance of transfer expenditures
in relation to various national income and product aggregates in
the respective economies of France, Britain, and the United States
can be concluded by rearrangement of the data in yet another way.
This is done in Table XII. The objective here is to relate taxes
and government expenditure to the national income in a manner
that permits us to compare the over-all impact of both taxation and
TABLE XII

The National Income, Taxes, and Public Expenditure
i/1 France, the United Kingdom, and the United States: 1952

(in percent)

Private Income trom Production
From Employment
From Enterprise and Property
Corporate Income
National Income
Taxation
Taxes on Consumption
Indirect Business Taxes
Social Security Taxes
Total
Taxes on Income
Personal Income
Business Income
Total
Total Taxes
Government Expenditure
Nonredistributive Expenditure
Government Consumption
Debt Interest
Total
Redistributive Expenditure
Transfers to Persons
Subsidies to Business
Total
Total Expenditure

France

United Kingdom

United States

57.0
36.5
6.5
100.0

73.1
16.2
10.7
100.0

66.3
19.9
13.8
100.0

22.2
8.4
30.6

18.3

9.6
1.3
10.9

4.2
22.5

8]

14.6
3.6
18.2

39.5

40.7

21.5
l.l
22.6

23.2
5.7
28.9

26.6
1.7

15.8

7.3
3.0
10.3
39.2

4.1

5.0
3.9

4.3
ZO.1
42.7

13.2
7.1
20.3
31.2
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government expenditure in the three countries. National income
is chosen as the basic magnitude against which taxes and government expenditure are measured, for it represents the total of income earned by resource owners in the process of production. We
can then determine the proportion of private income that is channeled into the government sector for public purposes, and this
will yield us a satisfactory measure of the relative "burden" of
government activities in the economies of the three countries. In
the table, taxes are classified according to whether their presumed
incidence is on consumption-i.e., prices-or incomes, and government expenditures are grouped according to whether or not they
are redistributive in intent. In this way we can discern not only
what proportion of private income earned in production is channeled into the public sector, but also the essential characteristics
of the tax mechanism that brings about this transfer of income
from private to public use. Then, the breakdown of government
outlays into the categories of redistributive and nonredistributive
permits us to see the relative importance of the various uses made
by the government of the total financial resources placed at its
disposal by the taxation process.
Let us examine first the data on taxation. In both France and
the United Kingdom the tax total absorbs a significantly higher
proportion of private income earned in production than in the
United States. In France and Great Britain the percentage figures
are 39.5 and 40.7 respectively, while the comparable figure for the
United States is 31.2 percent. Thus we can say that in both the
former countries the government is more deeply involved in the
nation's economic affairs simply because of the larger proportion
of the national income that flows through the public sector. This
is not unexpected, though, because of the more extensive development of the welfare state in both France and the United Kingdom.
But even though France and Britain divert about the same
proportion of their respective national incomes to the government
sector for various public purposes, there are important differences
between the two countries as respects the means by which this is
accomplished. Taxation is, of course, the chief instrumentality
through which resources (real and monetary) are diverted from
private to public use, but the kind of taxes resorted to have vastly
different economic effects. The taxation process diverts income
to the public sector either directly by reducing the money income
of the consumer, as is the case with the taxation of incomes, or in-
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directly by reducing his real income through price changes, as is
the case with excise or consumption taxes.
Aside from this fact, there are other points of importance involved in the over-all character of the tax structure. There is, first
of all, the vital question of equity in taxation. The regressive
character of indirect or consumption taxes is widely recognized,
and this is a factor that cannot be ignored in an evaluation of the
incidence of the benefits and costs associated with the welfare state.
Furthermore, the price effects allied with indirect taxation may
have undesirable consequences in other sectors of the economy. \Ve
commented elsewhere in this chapter on the adverse effect that
France's tax structure has on the nation's balance of payments
position. Finally, it should be emphasized that indirect taxation
tends to conceal the real costs of public activity, because the diffusion of these costs throughout the economy via the price mechanism
makes it almost impossible for the citizen to know precisely what
proportion of his income is being absorbed for public purposes.
The reader will without doubt, recognize in this a preference for
direct rather than indirect taxes, simply because, in the last analysis,
all taxes are paid out of current real income. From the standpoint
of both equity and civic responsibility it would be preferable if this
fact was adhered to in matters of tax policy.
If ·we grant validity to the ideas discussed above, then the tax
structure of France is clearly less satisfactory than that of either
the Onited Kingdom or the United States. In France taxes on
consumption absorb 30.6 percent of the national income, as compared to 22.5 percent in Britain and only 10.9 percent in the
United States. Taxes on income, on the other hand, equal only
8.9 percent of the national income in France, in contrast to 18.2 percent in the United Kingdom and 20.3 percent in the United States.
In comparison to both the United Kingdom and the United
States the over-all tax structure in France is not only more
regressive, but constructed in such a way that an important proportion of the real costs of public activity are concealed from the
general public. The system, moreover, is badly adapted to combat
inflation; on the contrary it is in a sense an engine of inflation, for
with the large role accorded to indirect taxation, any increase in
taxes will have adverse repercussions on the price level. To summarize the analysis at this point, we can say that as respects France
and the United Kingdom the relative tax burden of the two countries is about the same, but the distribution of the tax burden in
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France is less equitable than in Britain, while the adverse effects
of the tax system on the economy are undoubtedly greater in
France than they are in the United Kingdom. These same conclusions apply with respect to France and the United States, except
that the over-all tax burden is significantly lower in the United
States.
The data on the distribution of public expenditures between
those that are redistributive in character and those that are not
simply add an additional confirmation to our previous observations
on the greater importance of transfer expenditures in France's
economy as compared to the economies of the United Kingdom and
the United States. In France redistributive expenditures equal
20.1 percent of the national income, while the corresponding figures
for Britain and the United States are 10.3 and 4.1 percent. respectively. Since the percentage differences in government consumption
for the three countries are not nearly so great, the conclusion is
inescapable that transfer payments are the major factor responsible
for the relatively larger role that the public sector occupies in the
French economy.
The conclusions reached in this chapter may be briefly summarized as follows. First, all of the data that we have examined
pertaining to national product, personal income, taxation, and
government expenditure support the hypothesis that France has
become more of a welfare state than either the United Kingdom or
the United States, providing we accept as our measurement criterion
the various ratios that exist between transfer expenditures for
welfare purposes and other key economic aggregates.
Second, these same data show that the French economy is less
industrialized than the economies of either the United Kingdom
or the United States, and consequently less favorably situated from
the standpoint of being able to support the real costs of the welfare state. The latter point rests upon the assumption that there
exists a direct relationship between industrialization and real
income, and that the real income level necessarily imposes practical
limitations on the extent to which income can be redistributed
without resort to indirect taxation.
Finally, the data reveal that France's tax structure is badly
designed, from the standpoint of equity for the citizen and that of
measurement of the real costs of public activity. It goes without
saying that the latter is an inescapable necessity for responsible
policy-making in a democratic society. From the point of view of
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the functioning of France's social security system, the excessive
dependence of the state upon indirect taxation means that there
is much uncertainty about the real incidence of the system's costs
and, as a consequence, no assurance that the system in its over-all
impact is necessarily progressive.

4 / _ The Distribution

of Income in

France

N CHAPTER 3 we analyzed the welfare state in France from the
point of view of the impact of welfare expenditures on the budget of the state and the national income. In this chapter we shall
analyze the distribution of money income in France, paying particular attention to the effect of welfare expenditures on the pattern
of income distribution. As in the previous chapter, most of the
data are presented in percentage form, as our primary purpose is
to effect comparisons.
The actual distribution of money income in France's economy
will be studied from three points of view: (1) the distribution of
income between social classes; (2) the distribution of income between income classes or brackets; and (3) the distribution of income within the social classes by range of income. In each of these
categories the distribution of income resulting from participation
in the productive process-i.e., factor income-will be discussed, and
then the impact of welfare expenditures upon this distribution will
be analyzed. Within the limits of available data, the distribution
of factor income corresponds to the concept of an initial distribution
of income discussed in Chapter 1, while transfer expenditures reflect
policy measures designed to alter the distribution of income,1
In a broad sense, redistribution of income in a society may be
either vertical or horizontal. The term "vertical" refers to the redistribution of money income between different income groups, i.e.,
from the upper to the lower income ranges, and the usual mechanism
for this is the progressive income tax. "Horizontal," on the other
hand, refers to the redistribution of income among members of the
same income class. Welfare benefits that accrue to persons on some

I

1

See the tables in the appendix for these data in absolute amount.
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basis other than their income status may bring about a horizontal
redistribution. This is the case, for example, with family allowances,
for they tend to redistribute income from small to large families,
irrespective of the income status of the latter. As respects the distribution of income between social groups, welfare expenditures
may bring about a vertical redistribution if a particular social group
has a decidedly more unfavorable income status than other groups
in the society and benefits to a greater extent than others from
welfare expenditures. As was pointed out in Chapter I, the actual
pattern of income redistribution resulting from the functioning
of the apparatus of the welfare state depends upon both the nature
and incidence of benefits and the means employed to finance them.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BETWEEN SOCIAL CLASSES

In this section we shall analyze the distribution of income between the major social classes in France. The classes or groups
treated are: farmers other than wage-workers in agriculture; the
self-employed; wage and salary employees; and the nonactive population. The latter, of course, does not include dependents of persons in the first three categories, but does include all other persons
receiving either factor or transfer income. The data analyzed in
this section do not include either income received by nonnationals
residing in France or French nationals living abroad. The groups
discussed in the section are determined on the basis of the major
source of income for the head of the household, and the resulting
categories correspond roughly to the division of French society
along class lines. 2
Table XIII shows (in percent) both the major sources of personal
income for persons in the above-mentioned social categories and
the disposition made of this income. The major objective of these
data is to indicate the relative importance of transfer or welfare
expenditures as a source of income on a social or class basis. In
Chapter 3 we examined the importance of transfer expenditures
2 A word of caution is in order here. for there are additional and subtle class
distinctions in French SOciety within these very broad social categories. The wageearner group, for example, lumps together wage-earners proper-Le., "workers"
-and all other salaried employees, including high civil servants and persons in
the upper echelons of management. Obviously there are class distinctions of
importance between such permns. In the self-employed category there are not
only small businessmen in trade and commerce but artisans and, as well, members of the liberal professions. At best, then, these categories correspond only
approximately to the highly stratified class structure of French society.
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in the personal income account for the economy as a whole (Tables
VI, X); here we are concerned with the extent to which persons
belonging to a particular class or social group benefit from these
expenditures.
On the basis of the data in Table XIII it is apparent that the
major beneficiaries of welfare expenditures in France are to be
found in the nonactive segment of the population. Persons in this
category derive 57.3 percent of their money incomes from transfer
expenditures, and only 42.7 percent from factor payments. This
means, in other words, that the social security system functions in
such a way as to bring about a significantly large transfer of money
income from the active to the nonactive population. This is not
surprising, however, in view of the fact that pensions for retired
and disabled workers constitute one of the most important elements
of the system. The actual amounts of income transferred via the
mechanism of the social security system will be examined subsequently.
Wage-earners are the second most important group of beneTABLE XIII

Personal Income and Outlay by Social Groups: 1952
(in percent)
Farmers

Sources of Income
From Production
Wages and Salaries
Unincorporated
Enterprise
Other Property
Income
Total
From Transfers
Social Security
Assistance
Other
Total
Personal Income
Personal Outlay
Consumption
Taxes
Income
Social Security
Total
Personal Savings
Personal Income
,.. A \'erage for the economy.

7.3
81.8
2.5

SelfEmployed

11.8
78.3

WageEarners

Nonactive

Total'

75.0

21.2

44.1

3.9

91.6

3.8
-93.9

81.9

3.0

4.2
2.9
1.3

2.4
1.4
2.3

15.2
2.5
0.4

SA

6.f

100.0

100.0

94.3

5.7

-15.8
-

32.7
4.6

42.7

81.4

lsI

44.0
8.9
4.4
57.3

14.1
3.1
1.4
18.6

100.0

100.0

100.0

84.5

87.9

83.8

87.6

0.9
0.4

4.1
2.4

2.5
3.8

1.4
1.2

2.5
2.7

1.3
4.4

6.5
9.0

6.3
5.8

2.6
13.6

5.2
7.2

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0
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ficiaries of the social security system, as persons in this class receive
IS.1 percent of their incomes in the form of transfer payments and
SI.9 percent from participation in production. Farmers obtain S.4
percent of their income from transfers and 91.6 percent from factor
payments, while the self-employed benefit the least from the system,
receiving only 6.1 percent of their personal incomes from transfers
and 93.9 percent in the form of factor income. On the basis, then,
of the relative importance of transfer expenditures as a source of
personal income, our conclusion at this point is simply that the
transfer mechanism of the social security system favors the nonactive population and wage-earners the most, and farmers and selfemployed the least.
The data on the disposition of personal income in Table XIlI
are of interest primarily because of what they reveal about the relative tax burden for the different social classes. In Chapter 3 we
pointed out that the direct tax burden on the individual is not
particularly heavy in France, especially when compared to the
United Kingdom and the United States. Of equal interest and
significance is the allocation of direct taxes among the social groups
in the economy. From the point of view of the proportion of personal income paid out in taxes, farmers are in the most favored
position in French society, as only 1.3 percent of their personal
income goes for tax payments, including both income and social
security taxes. Actually farmers are in a more favorable position
than persons in the nonactive category, even though members of
the latter group are, on the average, less well off in terms of personal
income than any other group in France (see Tables XV, XVI, and
XVII). The major reason for this is the favoritism accorded the
agricultural sector of the economy by the tax authorities. Of equal
significance is the fact that the tax situation for wage-earners and
the self-employed is approximately the same, even though the average income for members of these two groups differs widely. Direct
taxes take 6.3 percent of the wage-earner's income as compared to
only 6.5 percent for the self-employed. Again, the chief reason for
this is the widespread practice of fraud and evasion among the selfemployed.3
The actual pattern of income distribution between the major
social groups is indicated by the data in Table XIV. This table

8

See Note 4, Chapter 3.
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TABLE XIV

Distribution of Households, Income, Consumption, and
Taxes by Social Groups: 1952
(Percent of Totals)
Farmers

Number of Households
Income from Production
Transfer Income
Personal Income
Consumption
Taxes
Income
Social Sewrity

14:1
17.4
6.9
15:1
16.6
4.1
5.9
2.5

Self· Employed Wage.Earners

13.4
25.6
7.2
22.2
21.4
27.9
36.7
19.7

51.7
50.8
49.3
50.5
50.6
62.1
50.8
72.4

Nonactive

20.5
6.2
36.6
11.9
1l.4
5.9
6.6
5.4

shows the proportion of households4 to be found in each social
class, as well as the proportion of total factor and transfer income
received by members of the class. Similar data are included for
consumption expenditures and tax payments. Analysis of these data
permit us to see not only the income distribution pattern resulting
from the productive process, but also the way in which this pattern
is modified by the mechanism of transfer payments.
The first fact that emerges from the table is that the distribution
of income from production is skewed in favor of the farmers and
the self-employed. The latter class contains 13.4 percent of the
households in the economy, but receives 25.6 percent of the income
from production. Farmers, on the other hand, account for 14.4
percent of the households, and obtain 17.4 percent of the national
income. Wage-earners receive approximately the same percentage
share of the national income total as the proportion of wage·earner
households in the economy, the respective amounts being 50.8 and
51.7 percent. The nonactive group is clearly the least-favored social
class, as this category accounts for 20.5 percent of the household
total, and receives but 6.2 percent of the national income. The
picture is one of a relatively unequal distribution of initial or
factor income as between social classes, with the self-employed being
in the most-favored position and the nonactive in the least-favored.
The problem now becomes one of analyzing the impact of welfare or transfer expenditures on this distribution of income. For
this we must look at the distribution of transfer income among the
social classes, and the effects of the latter on the final distribution of
• The t.erm "household" i~ used to mean all persons living together who
normally pool their incomes to meet the major household expenditures. The
household, consequently, will not necessarily coincide with the family unit.
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personal income. The data in the table show that the distribution
of transfer income is skewed in the direction of the nonactive and
wage-earner classes; consequently, the over-all effect of transfer
expenditures is to reduce somewhat the inequality of the distribution of factor income between social classes. The nonactive population, with 20.5 percent of the total households, receives 36.6 percent
of the total of transfer income, while wage-earners, with 51.7 percent
of the households, receive 49.3 percent of the transfer income total.
Farmers and self-employed, on the other hand, receive only 6.9
Diagram II
The Proportionate Share of Social
Groups in the Income Totals
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and 7.2 percent respectively of the total of transfer payments. The
over-all effect, then, is to reduce the share of farmers in the total
from 17.4 percent (factor income) to 15.4 percent (personal income);
the share of the self-employed from 25.6 to 22.2 percent; the share
of wage-earners from 50.8 to 50.5 percent; and, finally, to increase
the share of the nonactive population from 6.2 to 11.9 percent.
These results are shown in graphic form in Diagram II. These data
also lend strength to the earlier conclusion that the workings of
the social security system favor the nonactive and wage-earner segments of the population to the greatest extent. Wage-earners, it
may be noted, receive the largest portion of the transfer income
total, even though this does not alter the over-all distribution of
income between social groups in the wage-earner's favor.
The remaining data in Table XIV pertain to the distribution
of consumption expenditure and tax payments between social
groups. With respect to the distribution of consumption expenditure there is little that needs to be said, as the pattern of consumption expenditure by social groups approximately parallels the pattern of income distribution. This is to be more or less expected
since the average level of real income in France is low relative to,
say, the United States. One would expect, however, that as the
average level of real income rises the distribution of consumption
expenditures would be less unequal than the distribution of income. This is so because a highly industrialized economy with its
emphasis upon mass production of standardized commodities requires for its effective functioning a mass consumption of these
commodities. 5
The data on the distribution of taxes-income and social security
-underscore further earlier conclusions concerning the inequities
inherent in France's tax structure. Farmers, according to Table XIV,
again appear as a highly favored class, as with 14.4 percent of the
households and 15.4 percent of the personal income total, they pay
only 4.1 percent of the total for all direct taxes. These data also
show farmers to be in a more favored position than the nonactive
segment of the population; the latter group receives a smaller proportion of the personal income total, but carries a larger share of
the tax total. The data on the self-employed and the wage-earner
classes indicate that these two groups have, in relation to their share
• This appears to have been the case in the United States. See Sidney Weintraub, Income and Employment Analysis, New York: Pitman, 1951, esp. Ch. 4.
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in the income total, about the same proportion of the total tax
load. Wage-earners receive 50.5 percent of the personal income
total and pay 62.1 percent of the total of direct taxes, while the
self-employed obtain 22.2 percent of the income total and pay 27.9
percent of the tax total.
The relative position of the different social classes with respect
to taxation can be seen more clearly if we compare for each group
the ratio of its proportionate share in the income total to its proportionate share in the total of taxes. If all direct taxes were levied
on a strict proportional basis, this ratio would be 1.00 for each
group. This is so because with proportional taxation a group receiving, for example, 25 percent of the income total would pay 25
percent of the tax total. This ratio cannot, of course, tell us anything about what should be, in the interests of equity, the degree
of progression in the tax system, but it will reveal for a particular
social group whether or not its share of the tax burden is proportionally greater or smaller than its share of the income total.
Thus a ratio greater than 1.00 indicates that a group's share in the
total tax burden is smaller than its share in the income total, and
a ratio less than 1.00 indicates that the group's share in the tax
burden is greater than its share in the income total. By comparing
these ratios for all the social groups we can get some idea of the
extent to which the tax burden for any particular group is progressive or regressive relative to the other groups in the economy.
The ratios for each social group for both the total of direct taxes,
and income and social security taxes considered separately, are
shown below:

All Taxes
Income Taxes
Social Security Taxes

Farmers

Self·
Employed

WageEarners

3.75
2.61
6.16

0.79
0.60
1.12

0.81
0.99
0.69

~on-

active

2.01
1.80
2.20.

The ratios demonstrate conclusively the favored pOSitIOn of
farmers in the economy; for all three tax categories the agricultural
ratio is higher than the ratios for any of the other groups. This
means simply that the effective rate of taxation on personal incomes in this sector is lower than it is for persons in any of the other
social classes. It means, too, that the tax structure is regressive as
between agriculture and some parts of the economy. Farmers are
taxed at a lower effective rate than wage-earners or the nonactive

74

/

The Welfare State in France

sector, even though the farmer's relative share in the income total
is greater than that of either of these groups, although there are
proportionally fewer agricultural households.
The ratio for the total of direct taxes is almost the same for the
self-employed and the wage-earners, even though the former group
receives a relatively larger share of the income total in relation
to its share in the number of households. With respect to the income tax alone, the ratios indicate there is some progression in the
effective rate of taxation as between the self-employed and the
wage-earners, but that this difference is largely offset by the fact
that for the latter group, the effective rate of social security taxation
is higher than it is for the self-employed. Thus the effective rate
of total taxation is seen to be about the same for the two groups.
notwithstanding the large disparity in their relative income positions. The ratios for the nonactive segments of the population show
that the tax structure is mildly progressive as respects the relative
income position of persons in this category, but less favorable to
members of this group than to persons in the agricultural sector.
The over-all picture resulting from the comparison of these
ratios is one of an arbitrary and inequitable tax structure. With
respect to the relative income position of the different social classes,
the tax structure cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
labeled progressive. 6 Farmers are an especially favored group, and
the wage-earner class assumes a larger share of the total tax burden
than is justified by its relative share in the income total. The selfemployed, while not so favorably treated as the agriculturists, are
taxed much less heavily in relation to their income status than are
the wage-earners. It is only with respect to the nonactive segment
of the population that the tax structure appears to be progressive
in any fair sense of the term.
• There is, of course, no objective criterion by which the "proper" amount of
progression in the tax structure can be determined. In fact it seems to the
writer that the view that, in the interests of equity, progression in the taxation
of incomes is necessary, rests, in the last analysis, upon a value judgement. Use
of the concept of diminishing marginal utility to justify progression in income
taxation no longer seems appropriate on either theoretical or practical grounds.
\V'hat is left, essentially, is the fact that progre~sive taxation is accepted as a
reasonable and equitable form of taxation in modern society, and the appropri·
ate degree of progression must remain a matter about which reasonable men
will differ. The same holds true with respect to the alleged adverse effects of
progressive taxation 011 incentives to produce, for there is no objective criterion
by means of which the point at which progression impedes incentives can be
determined.
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The analysis of the distribution of income between social groups
will not be complete without examination of the income position
of persons in each of these groups on the basis of the average income per household and per capita. The distribution of the total
income among social groups does not in itself tell the whole story
of the relative income position of the various groups in the economy.
For this we need to make use of averages, such as income per household and income per capita, as these permit us to make a more
direct comparison of the income status of persons in the different
economic sectors. This is done in Tables XV, XVI, and XVII, which
show average income and taxes per household and per capita for
each of the social groups under consideration.7
TABLE XV
Income and Taxes per Household by Social Groups: 1952
(in francs and percent)
Social Group

Farmers
Self-Employed
'V age-Earners
;\ionactive
Average for
the Economy

Income
per
Household

Percent
of National
Average

Taxes
per
Household

Percent of
Income per
Household

814,213
1,266,301
744,721
443,010

106.7
166.0
97.6
58.1

11,168
81,644
47,059
1l,469

1.4
6.5
6.3
2.6

762,830

100.0

39,223

5.1

In Table XV the data pertain to average income per household.
The income data in the table are for total income, including transfer payments, and thus they represent an average based upon the
distribution of the personal income total shown in Table XIV. As
respects income per household, the self-employed are in the most
favorable position, as the average income per household for families
in this category is 66 percent greater than the average for the
economy as a whole. Farmers have an average income per household
slightly higher than the national average, while wage-earners are
slightly below the national average. The nonactive segment is
clearly the least favored, as the average income per household III
this category is only 58.1 percent of the national average.
7 The data in Table XVII are derived by converting the franc amounts in
Tables XV and XVI to dollars at the official rate of exchange of 420 francs to
the dollar. These data give only an approximation of the real value of the income figures expressed in dollars because the offiCIal rate of exchange does not
necessarily reflect real differences in the purchasing power of the two currencies.
Moreover, the consumption patterns of households in the United States and
France are by no means identical.
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The previously mentioned disparities in the tax position of the
different social classes are reflected in the data in this table. Farmers
are the most favored, while the direct tax burden on wage-earner
and self-employed households is of about the same magnitude, even
though the income of the latter is, on the average, over 66 percent
greater than that of wage-earner households. Taxes as a percent
of income per household are lower for the nonactive group than
for either the wage-earners or the self-employed, but higher than
for the farmers. Once more the evidence points to the absence of
any significant degree of progression in the structure of direct taxes.
The income position of the social groups vis-a-vis one another
appears in a somewhat different perspective if we examine the
data pertaining to average incomes per capita in each of the social
categories. These data appear in Table XVI. Income per capita is
perhaps a somewhat better measure than income per household
of the relative poverty or affluence characteristic of a given social
class. This is because of differences in the size of the typical household in the various social groups. The average income per household may be higher for a given social class than, say, the average for
the economy, but the real income level for the same class may be
lower than the national average if this income is spread over a
larger number of persons. This is the situation in France, as the
average number of persons per household varies significantly from
one class to another. Agriculture leads in this respect, with an
average of 4.1 persons per household. For the self-employed the
average is 3.2 persons per household, as it is for the wage-earner
class. Households are smallest in the nonactive group, with an
average of only 2.2 persons per household. s
TABLE XVI

Income and Taxes per Capita by Social Groups: 1952
(in francs and percent)
Social Group
Farmers
Self-Employed
'Vage-Earners
Nonactive
Average for
the Economy

Income
per
Capita

Percent
of National
Average

Taxes
per
Capita

Percent of
Income per
Capita

199,254
391,694
234,031
199,354

8l.6
160.4
95.2
8l.6

2,732
25,254
14,788
5,161

1.4
6.5
6.3
2.6

244,249

100.0

12,559

5.1

• l\Iinistcre des Finances, des Affaires t.conomiques, et du Plan, Rappm·t sur
les Comptes de fa Nation, Vol. n, Paris, 1955, p. 243.
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The per capita data, consequently, change somewhat the picture
of the relative economic position of persons in the different social
groups. In the main, agriculture is seen as less favorably situated
than is indicated by the average income per household data, while
the nonactive class is somewhat better off. Essentially these data
show that the two major problem areas of France's economy.as far
as poverty is concerned are the agricultural sector and the nonactive
population. 9 Poverty in the latter group is to be more Or less
Diagram III
Average Income Per Household and Per Capita
For Farmers, Wage.Earners, and· Nonactive
Population as a Percent of the Average
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• Poverty, of course, is a relative term. The word has no objective meaning,
and it is used here only as a descriptive term applied to segments of France~s
economy thal are less well off than others.

78

/

The Welfare State in France

expected in any society, since retired workers and other persons not
able to work cannot, for the most part, obtain incomes on a par with
the economically active segment of the population. The existence of
sub-par income levels among the inactive segment of the population is, to be sure, a serious economic problem in most western countries, but it is mitigated to some extent by the fact that consumption
needs of persons in this category are frequently lower than the
needs of persons in other sectors of the economy. The relatively
low level of per capita income in the agricultural sector of France's
economy is largely a consequence of technological backwardness in
this sector and the relatively large proportion of the labor force still
engaged in primary pursuits. 10 The real solution for agricultural
poverty lies in a continuation of the industrialization and modernization programs that France has been pushing since the end of the
war.
The differences just discussed between the income per house·
hold and the income per capita data as respects the relative income
position of persons in the four social classes are shown graphically
in Diagram III. In this diagram both income per household and
income per capita for the farmers, wage-earners, and nonactive
group are expressed as a percentage of these same magnitudes for
the self-employed. This diagram permits us to see how the income
position of these three groups compares with that of the most
favored group on both a per household and per capita basis.
TABLE XVII

Income and Taxes per Household and per Capita
by Social Groups: 1952
(in dollars)
Social Group

Farmers
Self-Employed
Wage-Earners
Nonactive
Average for
the Economy

Income
per
Household

Taxes
per
Household

Income
per
Capita

Taxes
per
Capita

$ 2,326
3,618
2,128
1,237

$ 32
233
13:,
33

$ 569
1,119
669
569

$ 8

2,179

112

698

35

72

42
15

10 In 1953, 30.8 percent of France's labor force was still employed in agriculture. National income per employed person is also lower in agriculture than in
any other sector of the economy. See "The National Product and Structural
Change in the French Economy," op. cit.
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Before turning to the discussion of the distribution of income by
income range or bracket, we need to analyze the net gain or loss of
income that each social group experiences as a result of the operation of the social security system. This is done in Table XVIII,
which indicates for each social class the amount of income received
by members of the class in the form of social security benefits, and
the amount of taxes paid by members of the class for the direct
support of the social security system. The difference between these
two sums measures the extent to which the group or class gains
or loses income through the mechanism of the social security
system. In connection with this latter point, it is important to note
that if the social security system were designed to avoid all transfers
of income between social groups, and if it were financed wholly by
contributions from the beneficiaries, there would be neither a net
gain nor loss for each of the different social categories taken as a
whole. Such a system, if it could exist and function, would simply
redistribute income among members of the same social class. In
such an instance, the most characteristic form of redistribution
would be from the active to the nonactive population, although
this would be modified to some extent by the existence of a system
of family allowances.
TABLE XVIII

Net Transfers of Income by Social Groups: 1952
(billions of francs)
SelfFarmers Employed

Social Security Income
Social Security Taxes
i'Jet Gain or Loss

68
7

56
55

61

I

WageEarllers

Nonactive

798

544
15
529

202
596

Total

1,466
279
1,187

But as the data in Table XVIII reveal, this is not the case as
respects the workings of the French social security system. As a
matter of fact all of the social classes under consideration experience
a net gain in money income from the system, although the amount
of the gain is of negligible importance in the case of the self-employed. The wage-earners and the nonactive population gain the
most, as these two groups receive the overwhelming proportion of
the net amount of income transferred by the social security mechanism.
At first glance the data in this table may seem to be curiously
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paradoxical, for the statement that all social classes experience a
net gain seems to suggest income is being transferred in such a
way that everyone gains and nobody loses. This, of course, is mani·
festly impossible, for the idea of a transfer of income inherently
means that some person or group in the economy receives income
at the expense of some other person or group. The solution to this
apparently paradoxical situation in France resides in the fact that
the great bulk of these income transfers are financed by indirect
taxation. As shown in Table XVIII, individuals in the aggregate
pay into the public treasury only 279 billions of francs to finance
social security expenditures, but they draw benefits from the
treasury with a value of 1,466 billions of francs. The significance
of this is that the amount of real income transferred between social
groups possibly may. be greater than is suggested by available data,
but in the absence of accurate information on consumption patterns,
the whole incidence of the costs of social security is indeterminate.
We are left, too, with the probability that most of the incidence of
the system is on the beneficaries because of the price effects associated with indirect taxation. Wage-earners and other major
beneficiaries of the system, in other words, no doubt pay enough
in higher consumption taxes to offset the monetary benefits they
receive from the system.
We can summarize tl1e major conclusions reached in this section
as follows: First, the distribution of income among the major social
classes in France is relatively unequal, the farmers and the sel£employed being the most favored, while wage-earners and the nonactive population are the least favored. Second, the mechanism of
transfer expenditures modifies the distribution of personal income
so as to improve somewhat the relative income position of the nonactive portion of the population. The social security system, in
other words, does operate to reduce inequalities in the distribution
of income between social classes. Third, the data pertaining to
taxes and the distribution of the total of direct taxes between social
groups reveal that the tax structure is not in any sense equitable,
if some significant degree of progression in the tax structure is
deemed desirable from the point of view of equity. These same
tax data lend statistical support to the widely held view that fraud
and evasion are commonplace in France. Finally, no clear-cut
pattern of income redistribution between social classes emerges
because of the great extent to which the social security system depends upon indirect taxation as a source.
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DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BY INCOME RANGE

From the analysis of the distribution of income between social
classes, we now turn to a discussion of the distribution of income
by range or class of income. The framework of analysis will be
similar to that employed in the previous section. First, we will
determine the major sources of income for each of the income
classes;l1 second, we will analyze the distribution of households,
income, consumption, and taxes by income range; and, finally, we
will discuss the relative position of the different income classes on
the basis of the average income per household and per capita. In
the previous section we were concerned with inequalities between
social classes or groups; here our concern is with inequalities between individuals or households, irrespective of social class or major
source of income. The analysis also permits us to see to what extent,
if any, the social security system is a mechanism for a vertical redistribution of income.
Table XIX contains data (in percent) on the origins of personal
income for households in four income brackets and, as well, the
disposition of this income. The pattern revealed by these data as
to the origin of personal income is clear-cut. Transfer payments are
of greatest significance as a source of personal income for households in the lowest brackets, and of least significance for households in the upper income brackets. Households whose annual
average income is less than 535,900 francs ($1,530) derive 33.1 percent of their money income from transfers, while households having
an average annual income of over 1,398,000 francs ($3,944) obtain
only 7.7 percent of their personal income from this source. The
data show, moreover, that transfer expenditures are progressive,
in that the proportion of personal income originating from transfer
payments declines as one moves from the lower to the upper
brackets of the income scale. There is only one other thing to note
here, and this is that wage and salary income becomes increasingly
less important as a source of income in the upper ranges; conversely, entrepreneurial and other forms of property income be11 Unfortunately frop! the standpoint of more precision in the analysis, the
available data permit the use of only four income classes or brackets. It is only
recently that any systematic attempt has been made to measure statistically the
distribution of income in France, long recognized by most authorities to be
highly unequal. The data upon which this study is based constitt!lte, to the best
of the writer's kuowledge, the most recent and complete information on the suhject.
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come more significant as an income source in these ranges. This
pattern is in accord with earlier observations concerning the relative income position of the different social classes. That is to say,
the largest proportion of the self-employed households are to be
found in the upper income brackets, while the majority of wageearner households are in the lower brackets (see Table XXVI). In
general, too, the data in Table XIX confirm conclusions previously
offered to the effect that the social security mechanism does improve
the income position of households least favorably situated.
TABLE XIX

Personal Income and Outlay by Income Range: 1952
(in percent)
Income Range"

Sources ot Income
From Production
\Vages and Salaries
Individual Enterprise
Other Property Income
Total
From Transfers
Social Insurance
Assistance
Other
Total
Personal Income
Personal Outlay
Consumption
Taxes
Income
Social Security
Total
Personal Savings
Personal Income

A

B

C

D

47.2
19.1
0.6

57.6
18.3
lA
77.3

43.0
39.0
4.9
86.9

18.5
60.7
13.1
92.3

9.9
2.4
0.8

2.1
1.8
3.8

l3J."

7:;

100.0

19.0
3.1
0.6
22.7
'100.0

100.0

100.0

103.8

89.8

84.4

76.0

0.4
2.4

1.5
3.1

3.0
2.9

4.9
1.9
6.8
17.2
100.0

~
2,;.7
6.1
1.3

"331

---u

-n;

----:5.9'

-

5.6
100.0

9.7
100.0

6.6
100.0

.. The income ranges are as follows:
A: Less than 535,900 trancs ($1,530).
B: 535,900 to 932,000 francs ($1,530 to $2,662).
c: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs ($2,662 to $3,994).
D: Over 1,398,000 francs (over $3,994).

The remaining data in this table pertain to consumption, taxes,
and personal savings. With respect to consumption and savings, the
pattern is essentially Keynesian, as the proportion of income saved
increases sharply in moving from the lower to the upper income
groups. In the lowest income bracket, consumption is in excess of
income-i.e., savings are negative-but in the highest income bracket,
savings amount to 17.2 percent of personal income.
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The data on tax payments lead to conclusions concerning
France's tax structure similar to those reached earlier, in that the
proportion of income devoted to tax payments by households in the
different income brackets does not differ greatly even though there
are large disparities in the money income of households in the
different ranges (see Tables XXII, XXIII) . In contrast to the tax
position of the different social classes though, some progression is
evident in the tax structure when the income data are arrayed by
income class. But the degree of progession is very slight, as the
effective rate of taxation (income and social security taxes) is only
6.8 percent of personal income for the highest income bracket, as
contrasted to 2.8 percent for the lowest bracket. Yet the average
income per household at the upper range of the income scale is
more than four times larger than the average at the lower end of
the scale (see Table XXII).
The effective rate of taxation for the personal income tax alone
is slightly more progressive, ranging from 0.4 percent of personal
income for the lowest income class to 4.9 percent for the highest
income bracket. But social security taxation is regressive, and this,
of course, makes the tax structure less progressive in an over-all
sense.
The extent to which the structure of both transfer expenditures
and tax payments is progressive is demonstrated graphically in
Diagram IV. This diagram shows for each income class the proportion of personal income received in the form of transfer payments and the proportion of income absorbed by tax payments.
The steepness of the slope of the appropriate lines in the diagram
indicates the extent to which both transfer payments and taxes are
progressive. It can easily be seen that transfer payments are relatively more progressive than direct taxes. The diagram also shows
that the combined effect of transfer expenditures and tax payments
does not bring about a vertical redistribution of income between
income classes in France. For this to happen it would be necessary
for the lines representing social security benefits and social security
taxes to cross, as a vertical redistribution can come about only if
some income groups pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits.
What Diagram IV actually shows is a situation analogous to that
which exists between the social classes. All of the income classes,
in other words, receive more in the way of money income in the
form of transfer payments than they payout in the form of direct
taxes.
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Diagram IV
Transfer Income and Taxes as a
Proportion of Personal Income by Income Range
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The actual amounts of income received as social security benefits and the social security taxes paid by households in each of the
income classes are shown in Table XX. These data indicate a net
gain for all income ranges, although the amount of the gain is
greatest for the two lowest income brackets. The gain for the
highest income class is negligible in amount. The explanation for
this is the same as that advanced during the earlier discussion of
the fact that all social classes experience a net gain in money income
from the operation of the social security system, i.e., it results from
the system's dependence upon indirect taxation for the major portion of its revenues. Consequently, we cannot make any categorical
statement as to whether or not the social security system brings
about a vertical redistribution of real income. The monetary bene-

The Distribution of Income in France

/

85

fits of the system, to be sure, are directed primarily to the lower
income groups, but the incidence of all the taxes that support the
system remains largely indeterminate. We must of necessity, then,
fall back on our earlier conclusion to the effect that the system's
costs are, in the last analysis, borne largely by its beneficiaries. No
other conclusion seems tenable, given the preponderant role assumed by indirect taxation in France's tax structure.
TABLE XX

Net Transfers of Income by Income Range: 1952*
(in billions of francs)

Social Security Income
Social Security Taxes
Net Gain or Loss

A

B

401
37
364

741
120
621

Income Range·
C
D

280
82
198

44
40
4

Total

1466
279
1187

• The income ranges are as follows:
A: Less than 535,900 francs ($1,530).
B: 535,900 to 932,000 francs ($1,530 to $2,662).
c: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs ($2,662 to $3,994).
D: Over 1,398,000 francs (over $3,994).

The next step in the analysis is to view the proportionate distribution of income, consumption, and taxes among the households
situated in each of the income classes. These data are shown in
Table XXI. The statistics here show, first of all, that the disTABLE XXI

Distribution of Households, Income, Consumption,
and Taxes by Income Range: 1952
(percen t of totals)

A

Number of Households
Income from Production
Transfer Income
Personal Income
Consumption
Taxes
Income
Social Security

30.2
12.4
26.8
15.0
17.8
8.1
2.4
13.3

Income Range·
B
C

40.0
35.6
45.8
37.5
38.5
33.8
23.8
43.0

• The income ranges are as follows:
A: Less than 535,900 francs (51,530).
B: 535,900 to 932,000 francs ($1,530 to $2,662).
c: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs. ($2,662 to $3,994).
D: Over 1,398,000 francs. (over $3,994).

20.2
28.8
18.9
27.0
26.0
31.2
33.2
29.4

D

9.6
23.2
8.5
20.5
17.7
26.9
40.6

14.3
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tribution of factor income is relatively unequal.1 2 At the lower
range of the income scale there are 30.2 percent of the total of
households in the economy, but these households receive only 12.4
percent of the income from production. At the upper extreme of
Diagram V
Distribution of Personal Income
in the French Economy
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12 IneQualitv in the distribution of income is, like progression in taxation, a
subjective concept. There are, in other words, no objective criteria to determine
how much equality or inequality in the distribution of income is a "good"
thing. This again is a matter of relative values, and a statement as above to the
effect that the distribution of income is relativelv uneaual mllst necessarily be
an expression of the writer's judgement. But as is the case with the progressive
income tax, the writer would argue that a more equal distribution of the national
income has become a widely accepted social objective in western societies.
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the scale there are 9.6 percent of the economy's households, and
these command 23.2 percent of the factor income. The distribution
of transfer income is, however, skewed heavily in favor of households in the lower brackets; hence, the major effect of the system of
transfers is to reduce inequality in the distribution of money income
between the income classes. The percentage share of the lowest
bracket in the income total is increased from 12.4 to 15.0, and the
percentage share of the highest bracket is reduced from 23.2 to 20.5.
The over-all effect of transfer payments on the distribution of
money income in the economy is shown graphically in Diagram V. 13
From the diagram it may be noted also that the distribution of
consumption expenditure is slightly less unequal than the distribution of income.
For analysis of the distribution of the tax burden among the
income classes, we will resort to the same ratios employed when
allocation of the tax burden among social classes was being considered. These ratios, it will be recalled, relate the proportionate
share of a group in the income total to its proportionate share in
the tax total. The ratios for each of the income ranges and for
both the total of all direct taxes and income and social security
taxes considered separately are shown below:
Income Range

All Taxes
Income Taxes
Social Security Taxes

A

B

1.85
6.25
1.20

1.10
1.57
0.87

C

0.86
0.81
0.91

D

0.76
0.50
1.43

These ratios indicate, first, that for all direct taxes the tax
structure is slightly progressive, since the ratios decline in moving
from the lower to the upper income ranges;14 and, second, that the
18 This is a Lorenz-type diagram in which the cumulative percentage of households, arrayed by size of income, is plotted on the horizontal axis, and the cumulative percentage of income received by these households is plotted on the vertical axis. The 45 degree diagonal represents the line of perfect equality, as along
it the proportion of households everywhere is equal to the cumulative proportion
of income received by them. The further the curves representing the actual
distribution of income lie below the 45 degree diagonal, the greater is the inequality in the distribution of income.
H It will be recalled from the earlier discussion that a ratio greater than one
indicates that the share of a group in the total ot taxes is smaller than its
share in the income total, and vice versa. Thus progression is indicated by lower
ratios for the upper income groups.
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income tax alone is more progressive than the total of all direct
taxes levied against households. This difference is accounted for
by the essentially regressive character of social security taxes. Thus,
in contrast to the distribution of the tax burden between social
groups, there is more progression in the tax structure from the
point of view of the distribution of the tax total among the different
income classes, but the actual amount of progression is quite mild.
This latter point is apparent in the data pertaining to average
income and taxes per household and per capita (see Tables XXII,
XXIII). The disparities in the average income per household in
each income bracket are, on the whole, much greater than the disparities in their tax burdens.
Before any further conclusions are suggested on the basis of
data discussed in this section, some additional remarks are in order
with respect to the per household and per capita income data. These
data are in Tables XXII, XXIII, and XXIV.t5 The main purpose
of the figures in these tables is to show the relative income position
of households in each of the income ranges in yet another perspective. The differences between the upper and lower range are
indeed great, as households in the lowest bracket have, on the
average, incomes slightly less than half the national average, while
households in the highest range have an average annual income
more than twice the national average. The per capita data, unlike
the per capita data for the different social classes, are similar in
pattern to the data on income per household by income range.
This is because the average number of persons per household is
approximately the same for all income classes. 16 As for taxes, we
need simply to point out once more that the comparative tax burdens per household and per capita contrast sharply with the comparative income averages.
To sum up the analysis to this point, we suggest that the data
considered support the following general conclusions. First, the distribution of income by income range shows a pattern of inequality
similar to that prevailing in the distribution of income between
social classes. Second, social security benefits and other transfer
15 The dollar values in Table XXIV are also computed by using the official
rate of exchange of 420 francs to the dollar.
10 This is so because the households in the different social classes are not
necessarily concentrated in one income range. Thus even though the number of
persons per household differs as between social classes, the number of persons per
household is approximately the same in each of the income classes.
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expenditures are directed primarily to households in the lower
ranges of the income scale, hence they serve to redress some of the
inequalities in the initial distribution of factor income. In other
words, both the data pertaining to the distribution of income between social classes and the distribution of income by income range
show that the structure of transfer expenditures is progressivei.e., the groups least favorably situated in the matter of income
benefit to the greatest extent from such expenditures. Third, and in
contrast to the situation as between social classes, there is a mild
progression in the structure of direct taxation as it affects the
different income classes. But the degree of progression is, in any
Fase, slight, and can hardly be termed equitable in view of the
large disparities between income averages in the different income
brackets. And, finally, it may be concluded that the relatively feeble
degree of progression in France's tax structure means that very
little-if any-vertical redistribution of income is effected in the
economy. The progressive structure of benefits, in other words, may
be nullified in whole or part by the indirect-and regressive-character of the tax system as a whole. As long as the overwhelming
proportion of transfer payments or welfare expenditures are
financed by indirect taxation, the real gains or losses that different
income and social groups experience must remain obscure.
TABLE XXII

Income and Taxes per Household by Income Range: 1952
(in francs and percent)

Income Range
Less than 535,900 francs
535,900 to 932,000 francs
932,000 to 1,398,000 francs
Over 1.398,000 francs
Average for the Economy

Income
per
Household

Percent
of National
Average

379,830
714,364
1,020,719
1,627,196
762,830

49.8
93.7
133.8
213.3
100.0

Taxes
Percent of
per
Income per
Household Household

10,450
33,120
60,705
110,008
39,223

2.8
4.6
5.9
6.8
5.1

TABLE XXIII

Income and Taxes per Capita by Income Range: 1952
(in francs and percent)
Income
per
Capita

Income Range
Less than 172,500 francs
172,500 to 300,000 francs
300,000 to 450,000 francs
Over 450,000 francs
Average for the Economy

122,684
226,634
329,036
519,512
244,249

Percent
of National
Average

50.2
92.8
134.7
212.7

100:0

Taxes
per
Capita

Percent of
Income per
Capita

3,375
10,507
19,569
35,122
12,559

2.8
4.6
5.9
6.8

TI
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TABLE XXIV

Income and Taxes per Household and per Capita by Income Range: 1952
(in dollars)

Income Range
Less than $1,530
$1,530 to $2,662
$2,662 to $3,994
Over $3,994
Average for the Economy

Income per
Household

Taxes per
Household

$1,085
2,041
2,916
4,648
$2,179

$ 30
94
173
314
$1l2

Income per
Capita

Income Range
Less than $410
$410 to $712
$712 to $1,071
Over $1,071
Average for the Economy

$ 351
647
940
1,484
$ 698

per
Capita

Taxe~

$ 10

30
56

IOn

'$1tl

THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME WITHIN SOCIAL CLASSES

The final step in our discussion of the distribution of money
income in France is to analyze the distribution of income within the
social groupings discussed earlier in this chapter. This procedure
not only will illuminate further some of the points already discussed, but will permit us to pinpoint more exactly the areas of
relative poverty and affulence in France's economy. Data just
analyzed show quite conclusively that the distribution of money
income in France is relatively unequal, as respects both social classes
and income brackets. But the pattern of income distribution prevailing in the economy as a whole is not necessarily duplicated
within the different social groups. Consequently, our purpose in
this section will be, first, to show in what parts of the economy inequality in income distribution is most pronounced; and, second, to
indicate the extent to which welfare expenditures reduce Inequalities within social classes.
To begin, we shall examine the major sources of personal income within the social groups treated in this study, and by range
of income. These data are found in Table XXV. By and large
the pattern pertaining to the origins of personal income for each
social category is similar to the pattern for the whole economy.
That is to say, households in the lowest income brackets in each
social class derive a substantial portion of their money income from
transfer payments. For households in the lowest income bracket, the
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proportions range from 14.8 percent in the agricultural sector to
77.6 percent for the nonactive population. For all the social classes,
the proportionate share of transfer payments in the personal income total declines as one moves from the lower to the upper income
ranges. This means simply that within the social classes, as well
as for the economy as a whole, the transfer mechanism operates
mainly in favor of the lower-income groups.
TABLE XXV
Origins of Personal Income within Social Groups
and by Income Range: 1952
(in percent)
Income Range·

A

Agriculture
Income from Production
Transfer Income
Self-Employed
Income from Production
Transfer Income
Wage-Earners
Income from Production
Transfer Income
Nonactive
Income hom Production
Transfer Income

B

C

D

85.2
14.8

91.5
8.5

93.0
7.0

95.7
4.3

66.7
33.3

84.3
15.7

96.1
3.9

96.2
3.8

68.5
31.5

83.3
16.7

88.0
12.0

88.4

22.4
77.6

12.6
87.4

48.4
51.6

81.9
18.1

11.6

• The income ranges are as follows:
A: Less than 535,900 francs
D: 535,900 to 932,000 francs
c: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs
D: Over 1,398,000 francs

Although the over-all pattern of transfer payments is similar
for all social groups, there are, nevertheless, some differences of
significance between the groups. In the agricultural sector, for
example, transfer payments as a source of personal income are of less
importance for all income brackets than for any other social class,
with the exception of the two highest income ranges in the selfemployed group. Households in the lowest income bracket for the
self-employed category derive a surprisingly large proportion of
their income from transfer payments, the amount being 33.1 percent. This implies a low standard of living which contrasts rather
sharply with the more affluent average for self-employed households. But this is mitigated by the fact that only a very small proportion of households in the self-employed group find themselves
in the lowest income range. For wage-earners, transfer payments
are an important source of income for all income ranges, although
their relative importance is still greatest for households in the lowest
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brackets. Among the nonactive population, transfer payments are
the major source of income for households in all but the highest
income bracket in this social category. In a general way the data
in Table XXV also show that as between social classes transfer payments as a source of personal income are of greater relative significance for wage-earners and the nonactive population for all income ranges, and that within each of the social classes, transfer
payments are relatively more important the lower the income level
of the household.
In Table XXVI the data are arrayed to show the distribution
of income before and after receipt of transfer payments within each
of the social classes. These data, which also array households according to income range, permit us to see the extent to which there
are important differences between the social classes in the matter
of income equality. The figures also show which of the social
classes have the greatest proportion of their households in the
lower income ranges, and thus provide an indication of the relative poverty or affluence characteristic of the various social groupings.
TABLE XXVI

Distribution of Households and Personal Income
within Social Groups and by Income Range
(percent of totals)
A

Agriculture
Number of Households
Income born Production
Transfer Income
Personal Income
Self-Employed
Number of Households
Income from Production
Transfer Income
Personal Income
Wage-Earners
Number of Households
Income from Production
Transfer Income
Personal Income
Nonactive
Number of Households
Income hom Production
Transfer Income
Personal Income
, The income ranges are as follows:
A: Less than 535,900 francs
B: 535,91}0 to 932,000 francs
c: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs
D: Over 1,398,000 francs

Income Range'
B
C

D

40.0
IS.5
35.1
19.9

34.9
32.9
33.6
33.0

15.0
22.5
IS.6
22.2

10.1
26.1
12.7
24.9

4.9
1.4
11.4
2.1

15.0
12.1
R5.0
13.5

4S.1
43.1
27.2
42.1

32.0
43.3
26.4
42.3

30.0
16.4
33.9
19.5

52.5
51.6
46.6
50.7

14.5
23.7
14.6
22.1

3.5
S.3
4.9
7.7

40.1
7.2
IS.6
13.7

29.9
9.5
49.2
32.2

19.9
29.3
23.3
25.9

9.9
54.0
8.9
28.2
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For the economy as a whole, 70.2 percent of the households have
an annual income of less than 932,000 francs ($2,662). These same
households receive 52.5 percent of the personal income total, including transfers (Table XXI). By comparing these figures to similar
ones for each social class, we can determine in approximate fashion
whether or not the distribution of income within the individual
classes is more or less unequal than that prevailing in the economy
as a whole.
In the agricultural sector 74.9 percent of the households are
located in the lowest two income brackets, and these households
receive 52.9 percent of the personal income total in this segment
of the economy. The comparative figures for wage-earners are 82.5
and 70.2 percent respectively, while for the nonactive population
70.2 percent of the households are in the two lower income brackets,
and they obtain but 45.9 percent of the income total. It is only in
the self-employed class that we find a sharp departure from the
over-all pattern, for in this category only 19.9 percent of the households are found in the two bottom income classes. These same
households receive 15.6 percent of the income total for this class.
For the economy as a whole, then, the concentration of households
in the lower ranges of the income scale is least for the self-employed
segment of the population, and greatest for the other three classes.
This is in line with conclusions reached in the first section of this
chapter concerning the relative income position of households in
the different social classes.
The extent to which the transfer mechanism reduces income inequalities within the social classes is readily discerned from the
data in Table XXVI. If we again look at the position of households
in the two lowest income brackets, it is apparent that transfer payments have their greatest impact in the nonactive category. The
70 percent of the households in this class having annual incomes of
less than 932,000 francs receive only 16.7 percent of the income total
before transfers-i.e., factor income. But transfer payments boost
the share of these households in the total to 45.9 percent. For the
other three social classes the change in income distribution as a
result of transfer payments is not nearly so great. In agriculture,
transfers increase the proportionate share of income received by
households in the two lowest brackets from 51.4 to 52.9 percent.
For the self-employed the change is from 13.5 to 15.6 percent and
for the wage-earners, from 68.0 to 70.2 percent. In sum, the system
of transfer expenditures has its most significant impact upon the
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distribution of income within the nonactive part of the population.
For the other social groups, it is true, there is a reduction in 111equality, but it is not nearly so pronounced as for this class.
Diagram VI
Distribution of Personal Income:
Agriculture
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The distribution of initial or factor income and the distribution
of personal income after receipt of transfer payments is depicted
graphically for each of the social classes in Diagrams VI through
IX. In these diagrams, the percentage distribution of households is
arrayed on the horizontal axis and the percentage distribution of
income on the vertical axis. The extent to which the curves representing the actual distribution of income depart from the line of
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equal distribution gives us a graphic picture of income distribution before and after the receipt of transfer payments.17 Inspection
of these diagrams indicates that on a class basis the distribution of
income is least unequal among the wage-earners and self-employed,
and most unequal in the agricultural and nonactive sectors. The
initial distribution of income is extremely unequal in the latter
Diagram VII
Distribution of Personal Income:
Self-Employed
Income from Production
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17 These diagrams are constructed in the same manner as Diagram V. See Note
13, this chapter.
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class. Inspection also shows that transfer expenditures do the most
to reduce inequalities in income distribtuion in the nonactive
population. Transfers also reduce inequalities to a considerable
extent among the wage-earners, but they do not have a very great
impact upon income distribution in either of the other two classes.

Diagram VIII
Distribution of Personal Income:
Wage-Earners
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Diagram IX
Distribution of Personal Income:
Nonactive
Income from Production
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Our final comments in this section concern the net gain or loss
that households in each of the income brackets and within each
social class experience from the combined effects of social security
benefits and social security taxes. These results are contained in
Table XXVII. With the exception of the self-employed and the
highest income bracket of the nonactive population, the general
pattern within each income class is the same as that of the whole
economy. That is to say, households in each of the income ranges
enjoy a net gain in money income from the system, although again
the amount of this gain is greatest in the lower income brackets.
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It is only within the self-employed category that we find evidence of

a vertical redistribution of income by means of the social security
system. In this class, the net loss of income among households in
the two upper income brackets is almost equal to the gain in income
experienced by households in the two lower brackets. In the nonactive class, households in the top income range have a net loss, but
the amount of the latter is insignificant in comparison with the
gains obtained by households in the other three income classes.
The reasons for the existence of a net gain in income for both
social and income classes have already been discussed, and need not
detain us again. This means, though, that the conclusions reached
earlier with respect to the incidence of the full costs of the social
security system apply equally to the situation as it exists within
the social classes.
TABLE XXVII

Net Transfers of Income by Social Groups and
by Income Range: 1952
(billions of francs)

Agriculture
Social Security Income
Social Security Taxes
Net Gain or Loss
Self-Employed
Social Securi ty Income
Social Security Taxes
Net Gain or Loss
Wage-Earners
Social Security Income
Social Security Taxes
Net Gain or Loss
Nonactive
Social Security Income
Social Security Taxes
Net Gain or Loss

A

B

26
3

24
2
22

23
5

26
8

Income Range'*
C

Total

D

11

7

I

I

10

6

19
26
-7

6
21
-15

68
7

tiT
56
55

-(

-5

Is

260
33
227

401
109
292

110
49

27
11

6I

16

798
202
596

110

290

140

I

I

6

109

289

1M

4
7
-3

544
15
529

. . The income ranges are as follows:
A: Less than 535,900 francs
B: 535,900 to 932,000 francs
C: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs
D: Over 1,398,000 francs

The most important findings that have resulted from the data
analyzed in this chapter have been indicated at appropriate intervals
in the preceding discussion of the different facets of income distribution in France. In concluding this chapter it is appropriate,
perhaps, to restate briefly the most important conclusions of the
analysis. Insofar as France's major social classes are concerned, the
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picture is one of relative inequality in the distribution of personal
income. Inequality in the distribution of factor income between
social classes is mitigated to some extent by the transfer mechanism;
the latter serves chiefly to bolster the income position of persons
in the nonactive population. This group has the least favored income position of any social class. Social security benefits and other
welfare expenditures are on the whole progressive in their effects.
No such progression obtains, however, with respect to the tax burden assumed by the different social classes. In short, the tax structure cannot be said to be equitable, as farmers and the self-employed
are in a privileged position vis-a-vis wage-earners and the nonactive
population.
For the distribution of income between income classes, the picture is much the same. A considerable inequality in the initial distribution of income is modified by the system of transfer payments,
the bulk of which are directed to households in the lower income
ranges. That tax structure as it pertains to the allocation of the
tax burden among the different income classes is seen as slightly
progressive, but not sufficiently so to compensate for the large disparities between the income position of households in the various
income brackets. There is no evidence to suggest any substantial
vertical redistribution of income between income classes through
the social security system. On the contrary, the dependence of
the system on indirect taxes for most of its financing suggests, at
the very least, that the beneficiaries of the system probably pay, via
the mechanism of the price system, most of the latter's real costs.
Finally, we analyzed the distribution of income within each of
the social groups. Within each group we found a similar pattern of
inequality in income distribution, modified in greater or lesser
degree by the mechanism of transfers. Interclass inequality is
greatest in the nonactive and agricultural sectors of the population,
and least for wage-earners and the self-employed. Social security
benefits are, on the whole, progressive in their impact within the
social classes, and for the nonactive population they, along with
other welfare expenditures, bring about a significant reduction in
income inequality. Within each social class, households in all of
the income ranges enjoyed a net gain in money income, with the
major exception of households in the two highest income brackets
for the self-employed group. In fact, it is only within the latter
category that we find any evidence of a vertical redistribution of
income via the social security system.
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Reflections on the Welfare State

HE WELFARE STATE, as the phrase has been defined and used
in this study, is largely a postwar phenomenon. In France,
as in the United Kingdom, it sprang from a vague though
widespread popular feeling that military victory over the Axis
powers would not be enough unless it was accompanied by the
creation of a more just, a more humane economic and social order.
It arose, too, out of a popular revulsion against real and imagined
shortcomings of prewar European capitalism, particularly the abuse
of monopoly power, the exploitation of labor, and excessive and
widespread inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income.
In Britain the Labour Party led in the assault on the social and
economic institutions of prewar capitalism. After Labour's victory
in the 1945 general election, the party began erecting a structure of
socialism in the United Kingdom. The Labour Party was only able
to maintain itself in power for five years, but the welfare state survived Labour's defeat, and remains, perhaps, the most durable part
of the edifice erected after 1945. In France there was no single party
of the left to formulate and champion demands for economic and
social reform. The prewar political parties and coalitions had
been discredited with the crushing collapse of the Third Republic
in 1940, so the whole matter of economic change was left to the
men of the Resistance. The National Council of Resistance,
organized in June, 1942, united in one body the Free French movement of General de Gaulle and the major resistance groups in occupied France. After the Liberation the Council became the nucleus
of the Provisional Government. The demands of the resistance
movement for postwar economic and social renovation in France
were formally expressed in the "Resistance Charter," issued at
Algiers in March, 1944.
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The Resistance demanded establishment of a "true economic and
social democracy," a slogan vague enough to mean whatever particular groups and interests on the French left wanted it to mean.
As for the Charter itself, it envisaged a program of economic and
social reform on two broad fronts. The first need was to destroy
the alleged control that the great industrial and financial truststhe so·called 200 families of prewar fame-exercised over the whole
of economic life in France. As in the United Kingdom, this was
to be achieved primarily through the nationalization of key industries, and economic planning in the national interest. Under
the heading of economic reform the Charter demanded the "rational
organization of an economy which will assure the subordination of
private interest to the general interest . . . intensification of national production along lines determined by the state after consultation with representatives of all elements in production ... " and
the "return to the nation of the great monopolies in the means of
production, the sources of energy, mineral wealth, and the large
banks .... "
The second need, in the eyes of the Resistance leaders, was the
creation in France of machinery to insure all citizens of a minimum
standard of well-being, and to bring about a more equitable distribution of the national income-in short, the creation of a welfare
state. The phrase "welfare state" does not appear in the Resistance
Charter, but the wording of the latter clearly spells out the intention
of the Resistance leadership to use the restored power of the French
state to effect the kind of social revolution envisaged in the idea of
the welfare state.
Unlike Britain, there did not exist in France after the Liberation a single political party with sufficient popular support to become the instrument for the economic and social reform planned by
the Resistance. The Constituent Assembly, elected in October, 1945,
was dominated by the three big parties of the Resistance, the Communists, the Socialists, and the Popular Republicans. Even though
each of these parties had endorsed the Charter prior to the general
elections, they were by no means in unanimous agreement as to
the actual reforms necessary to put its principles into effect. Within
a year, in fact, the coalition of the Resistance parties disintegrated,
and after this France, under the Fourth Republic, slipped rapidly
and easily back into the old, prewar habits of government instability
and shaky coalitions.
The consequence of this was to tarnish and distort the Resistance
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dream of a reborn France, purged of the weakness, the pettiness, and
the corruption of the prewar regime. It is true that the Provisional
Government wrought significant changes in the economic structure
of France, but in no instance were the reforms as far· reaching as
desired by the Resistance. A number of important nationalizations
were carried out in 1945 and 1946, but nationalization was not carried to the point envisaged by the Resistance groups, nor, for that
matter, as far as the Labour Party carried nationalization in Great
Britain. Some of the nationalization in France, moreover, was
purely punitive and unrelated to any comprehensive plan for economic control. Furthermore, machinery for national economic planning in the sense of centralized control over the use of the economy's resources was never even seriously considered after the
Liberation. French economic planning since the war has been
centered in the various modernization plans directed by the Commissariat General du Plan. While the latter body can point to
many remarkable achievements in modernizing and transforming
the economic structure of France, its powers, save for some control
over investment funds, have largely been persuasive. Finally even
the welfare state, which was to have been perhaps the great social
achievement of the Resistance, emerged in stunted form. The system of social security, for example, was intended to be uni"ersal,
benefitting all sections of the population equally, but the bitter
opposition of the self-employed above all, as well as of the beneficiaries of existing schemes, prevented this. The result, as we have
seen, was a structure of extreme complexity with an absence of
uniformity as respects the benefits available to different sectors of
the population.
But the main theme of this chapter is not the frustration of the
hopes of the Resistance for a reborn France. The concern of this
study has been the welfare state in France, and our purpose now is
to offer some final evaluation of this phenomenon. How well, in
other words, does it work? Has the welfare state in France achieved
the objectives of its architects? Has it, on balance, been beneficial
to France and the French economy? These are some of the questions
we must now try to answer.
At the onset one point can be disposed of rather quickly. This
has to do with the permanence of the welfare state apparatus in
France. In spite of what has been said above about the incompleteif not somewhat jerry-built-structure of France's welfare state,
there is no doubt in the writer's judgement that it has become a

Reflections on the Welfare State

/

103

permanent fixture in French economic life. As in the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent in the United States, the government of
France, irrespective of its political coloration, is committed to a
vast and complicated scheme for the redistribution of a significant
portion of the national income. To many, notably conservatives,
this is a fact to be deplored, but it is less than realistic to expect,
short of an unprecedented social upheaval, a dismantling of the
welfare state apparatus. In France, no less than in Great Britain,
the welfare state has been institutionalized, and what can be expected in the future is little more than "tinkering" in the hope of
improving its functioning.
The proportion of the French national income that is redistributed via the machinery of the central government is, as we saw
in Chapter 3, about twice as large as it is in the United Kingdom,
and almost five times greater than in the United States. Has this
enormous redistribution of the national income created in France
the kind of a welfare society envisaged by the architects of the idea?
In one sense at least the answer to this question is "yes." To the
extent that the welfare state idea means protection for the worker
against the hazards and uncertainties of contemporary economic
life, France has been as successful as any other nation in establishing the necessary machinery for this purpose. In terms of the comprehensiveness of the system, the French worker is well protected
against the risks of industrial life. The major uncertainties of an
industrial society are those of unemployment, premature death or
disability of the head of the household, prolonged illness, and old
age. France's social security system provides a vast array of benefits to cope with all these risks; the system can be said to be successful in that it meets the demand of the workers, which is particularly pronounced in France, for freedom from continued
anxiety about the future.
By American standards, to be sure, the amounts available for
different categories of social benefits are meager, indeed in some
instances pitifully meager. But this is simply a consequence of the
fact that the average real income in France is lower than that of
Britain or the United States. The point has been made before in
this study that what a nation can afford in the way of a redistribution of income for welfare purposes is in a broad sense a function
of its real per capita income. Moreover, the amount of these benefits must be yiewed in their proper context, which is in this instance
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a society in which nearly one-third of the wage-earner households
have incomes of less than $30 per week.
It would not be correct to say categorically that France's social
security system provides an acceptable minimum standard of wellbeing for all French citizens. This, along with protection against
the economic hazards of industrial life, is one of the major objectives of the welfare state. There still exist too many gaps in
the system for this to be completely true. But since there are no
absolutely objective standards of material well-being, what is acceptable as a minimum level is largely relative to the general
standard of living prevailing in a society. If France's welfare state
is viewed in this context, it is only right to say that it has achieved
much of worth in this respect.
Perhaps the most important facet of the welfare state in France
is the system of family allowances. This, as pointed out earlier, is
the really unique feature of the system. One would hesitate, perhaps, to attribute a cause and effect relationship to the family allowance system and the postwar increase in the birth rate, but it would
not be imprudent to maintain that this system has been at the very
least a factor in France's postwar demographic revolution. The
latter is, in the writer's view, one of the most hopeful of developments in the whole postwar picture, for France is literally a nation that is being reborn. It is on its way to becoming one of the
youngest nations in Western Europe, and within the next decade
or two France seems certain to be radically transformed both economically and socially as a result of the changing population picture.
If the welfare state and its system of family allowances has contributed to this, then this is, in the last analysis, all to the good.
Another, and in the eyes of some the most important, facet of
the welfare state concerns its impact on the distribution of income.
For the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, as well as for leaders
on the political left in France, a more equal distribution of the
national income has been and remains one of the major objectives
of the welfare state. Has this objective been satisfactorily achieved
in France? There cannot be, unfortunately, any simple and direct
answer to this question. As the data examined in the previous chapters indicate, the pattern of income distribution resulting from welfare expenditures is in a sense obscure and subject to varying
interpretations. It is true that the distribution of money or personal
income is less unequal after welfare or transfer expenditures than
it is before, and this is the situation with respect to the distribu-
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tion of income between both social classes and income classes. The
pattern of welfare expenditures is, as we have found, essentially
progressive. But these rather dear-cut results are rendered obscure
by the peculiarities of the French tax system. The latter depends
enormously upon indirect taxation to finance not only general
government expenditures but the bulk of welfare expenditures as
well. This results in confusion with respect to the real incidence of
the costs of government, and thus no single generalization about
the pattern of income redistribution is possible. It does seem to
the writer, however, that two points of significance should be
stressed. First, the data on France suggest strongly that only a
limited vertical redistribution of income is brought about by the
social security system. What the latter does, in general, is redistribute income within the social and income classes rather than between these classes. Second, both the data pertaining to France and
those pertaining to the United Kingdom examined in this study
indicate that the growth of welfare expenditures brings with it an
increase in the dependence of the government on indirect taxation
as a revenue source. This would imply that there does exist some
limit to the extent that any government can resort to direct taxes
for all of its revenue needs. Such a limit is a nebulous matter, but
it is, nevertheless, real. Insofar as the welfare state is concerned,
the implication of indirect taxation is clear, as it means that a
considerable portion of the real costs of welfare expenditures are
borne, in the final analysis, by the beneficiaries of these expenditures.
Thus we must remain somewhat agnostic with respect to the
efficacy of the welfare state as an instrumentality for effecting any
revolutionary change in the distribution of income.
Beyond these more immediate questions having to do with the
effectiveness of France's welfare state in relation to the latter's
specific objectives, there lie broader issues of value that arise out
of the growth of the welfare state in the postwar period. The issue
of most fundamental concern is whether or not the welfare state is
"good." This question has been the center of passionate controversy throughout the whole postwar period. Partisans of the welfare state idea argue that it represents the kind of social and economic transformation necessary to achieve the humane and democratic society envisaged by the liberal and socialist traditions of the
West, while its opponents argue with equal vigor that the whole
idea is a mistake and will lead inevitably to the totalitarian state
and the extinction of all forms of human liberty. This statement is
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of course but an approximate resume of the extreme positions on
both sides of the controversy, and is intended solely to illuminate
the basic issue in the simplest possible terms.
It is not our purpose here, however, to enter into a long discussion
as to whether or not the welfare state is "good." This after all is a
highly subjective matter, and there can be no final answer to the
question. In fact it really does not serve any particular usefulness
to put the matter in this context. The many very real problems associated with the welfare state idea will be more readily resolved
if we put the matter into an entirely different context.
The thesis advanced here is that the modern welfare state is only
the most recent manifestation of a powerful and perhaps irresistible
trend not only in Western society but in the world as a whole. This
trend is a persistent and ever-surging drive for more equality in the
distribution of real income. In a most vital sense the distribution
of income is a key problem in any society, and the failure of the
society to solve this problem in a satisfactory manner will inevitably lead to violent and costly social upheaval. In essence Marxism is nothing more than the most violent kind of challenge to the
alleged failure of capitalism to achieve distributive justice. Since
the inception of capitalism, much of the social and economic history
of the 'West revolves about the never-ceasing effort to modify existing
institutions and create new arrangements to cope with this force.
Today the setting is world-wide, for the cry for economic development and progress heard all over the world is, at the same time, a
cry for more equality in the distribution of income. The vast disparities in wealth and income between the developed and underdeveloped areas of the world can no longer be concealed. In the
West in times past such disparities were not tolerated indefinitely
once general awareness of them arose, and we are witnessing today a
similar phenomenon on a world-wide scale. That is to say, new
institutions and new social and economic arrangements are in the
making, and while their future form cannot be safely predicted, one
can be certain that they are being born out of the drive for a more
equal distribution of real income.
If we view the welfare state of contemporary Western society in
this perspective, the question of whether or not it is "good" in
some absolute sense really becomes quite meaningless. It must be
viewed as an aspect-and only one aspect-of the trend discussed
above. In this context the relevant problem is not one of choosing
between a welfare state or no welfare state. In most Western coun-
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tries, including the United States, the idea of the welfare state has
taken root and has become, in greater or lesser degree, em?odied
in institutions of great permanence. The real problem concerns the
efficacy of this particular phenomenon as a means of satisfying the
pressure for more equality in the distribution of income. This again
is a matter about which there can be no absolute answers, but in
concluding this study the following final conclusions are offered.
First, it is held that some form of "welfare statism" is no doubt
inevitable in advanced societies, particularly the advanced capitalistic societies of the West. There is, in the writer's view, nothing
to be feared in this in nations with strong and lively democratic
traditions. There is, in other words, nothing in recent experience
to suggest that the worst fears of the opponents of the welfare state
will materialize. It is further maintained that the welfare state
concept is simply the latest-and not necessarily the last-social innovation that has arisen to cope with the continued demands for
more equality in the distribution of income.
The second and final conclusion of our study is that the efficacy
of the welfare state as a means to cope with the problem of the
distribution of income is limited. In other words, the welfare state
idea may achieve desirable results with respect to the distribution
of income in a society up to a point, but thereafter the principle of
diminishing returns sets in. The key here, of course, is the phrase
"up to a point," and on this, unfortunately, we have little in the
way of objective criteria. Actually this is a matter that must be left,
in a sense, to the judgement of public opinion, shaped, as usually
is the case, by a society's intellectual and political leadership. About
all that we can suggest as a general principle is that a society must
become a "welfare state" to the extent necessary to prewnt disintegration and conflict over the question of distributive justice.
Once this is achieved, the continuing challenge of a better distribution of income is best met by measures that raise productivity and
real income for the whole society. In the final analysis, productivity
remains the real key to economic well-being, but advances in productivity can only take place within the setting of a stable social
order. The desirability of the welfare state must finally be adjudged
in terms of its contributions to this latter goal.

Appendix

The major source of data for this study has been the statistics
of national income and expenditure compiled by the French government. Basic data on the French national income are published
periodically by the Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs, and
Planning in the series Statistiques et Etudes Financieres. Compilation of national income data is the joint responsibility of the
Service des etudes economiques et fiancieres (S.E.E.F.), and the
1nstitut national de la statistique et des etudes economiques
(I.N .S.E.E.), both of which are a part of the Ministry of Finance,
Economic Affairs, and Planning. The work of these organizations is
reviewed and approved by the Commission des comptes et des
budgets economiques de la nation, formerly headed by M. MendesFrance.
French national income and social accounting is a postwar
development, as no effort was made by the French government prior
to the war to compile national income and product statistics on any
systematic basis. Between 1946 and 1950 this task was delegated to
the Monnet Plan administration (Commissariat General du Plan),
but after 1950 the responsibility was shifted to the S.E.E.F. and
I.N.S.E.E.
In 1951 the Commission des comptes et des budgets economiques
de la nation undertook a major revision of postwar national income
data, the results of which were published in the April-May, 1952,
issue of Statistiques et Etudes Financieres under the title Les
comptes de la nation pour l'annee 1949. This is a document of key
importance, as it established the basic conceptual framework employed in French national income and social accounting. The document is comparable in explanatory scope to the National Income
Supplements of the U. S. Department of Commerce.
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A second major revision of postwar data was published by the
Ministry of Finance in 1955 under the title Rapport sur les comptes
de la nation. Volume I presents a homogeneous series of data for
the period 1949-55, and Volume II consists of a detailed report on
the methods and sources utilized in French national income account·
ing. These two volumes have provided a large share of the statistical data utilized in this study. The source for prewar data is the
report Les comptes economiques de l'annee 1938, published in 1957
by the Ministry of Finance. This is a revision of the pioneer investigation into national income in 1938 carried out by the Commissariat General du Plan in 1947 and published under the title
Estimation du revenu national franfais. No comparable data on
national income have yet been published by the Ministry for the
postwar years prior to 1949 or for the war period, 1939-45.
The following tables present in absolute amount the most important data on income and expenditure utilized in this study. The
sources for data pertaining to the United Kingdom and the United
States are given in the appropriate tables.
TABLE XXVIII

Gross National Product and Expenditure in France: 1938, 1952
(billions of francs)
1938

Sources of GNP
Personal Consumption
Government Consumption
Gross Domestic Investment
Net Foreign Investment
Gross National Product
Allocations of GNP
Compen~ation of Employees
Income of Unincorporated Enterprise
Net Interest
Dividend Income
Corporate Income
National Income
Indirect Business Taxes
Business Transfer Payments
Less: Suhsidies Minus Current Surplus
of Government Enterprise
Net National Product
Capital Consumption Allowances
Gross National Product

1952

329
58
59
2
444

9,442
2,292
2,675
270

IR4
131
8
15
18

6,113
3,564
15
367
696

356
49

10,725
2,384
31

-

8

14,139

-

471

397
47

12,669
1,470

444

14,139

Sources: 1938 Data: Ministeres des Affaire. tconomique et FinanancU:res, Les Comptes Econ·
omiques de l'Annee 19)8, Paris. 1957.
1952 Data: Ministere des Finances. des Affaires tconomique. et du Plan, Rapport
sur les Comptes de la Nation. Paris, 1955.
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TABLE XXIX

Gross National Product and Expenditure in the
United Kingdom and the United States: 1952
United Kingdom
United States
(millions of pounds) (millions of dollars)

SOfJTCes of GNP
Personal Consumption
Government Consumption
Gross Domestic Investment
Net Foreign Investment
Gross National Product
Allocations of GNP
Compensation of Employees
Income of Unincorporated Enterprise
Corporate Income
Other Property Income
National Income
Indirect Business Taxes
Business Transfer Payments
Statistical Discrepancy
Less: Subsidies Minus Current Surplus
of Government Enterprise
Net National Product
Capital Consumption Allowances
Gross National Product

10,582
2,898
2,164
166
15,810

218,130
77,517
52,544
235
347,956

9,1l3
1,365
1,342
651
12,471
2,288
126

193,228
41,1l5
40,220
17,066
291,629
28,053
901
475

376
14,509
1,301
15,810

63
320,995
26,961
347,956

Sources: U.K. Data: Cmnd. 12J, White Paper on National Income, 1957.
U.S. Data: Dept. of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, July. 1953.

TABLE XXX

Personal Income and Outlay in the United
Kingdom and the United States: 1952
United States
(millions of dollars)

Sources of Income
Wages and Salaries
Individual Enterprise
Other Property Income
Total Factor Income
Transfers from Government
Transfers from Business
Total Transfer Income
Personal Income
Personal Outlay
Consumption
Taxes
Income
Social Security
Total Taxes
Personal Savings
Personal Income

8,587
1,365
1,433
1l.385
909

United Kingdom
(millions of pounds)

12.294

188.446
41,1l5
31,034
260,595
ll,960
901
12,861
273.456

10,582

218.130

1,179
476
1,655
57
12,294

34.645
3.796
38,441
16.885
273.456

-gog

Sources: U.K. Data: Cmnd. 12J, White Paper on National Income, 1957.
U.S. Data: Dept. of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, July, 1953.
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TABLE XXXI

Government Receipts and Expenditure in the
United Kingdom and the United Slates: 1952
United Kingdom
(millions of pounds)

United States
(millions of dollars)

Government Receipts
Direct Taxes
Individuals
Corporations

Total Direct Taxes
Social Security Taxes
Individuals
Business Firms

Total Social Security Taxes
Indirect Business Taxes

Total Tax Revenue
Other Receipts

Total Government Receipts

1,338
449
1,787

34,645
20,635
55,280

476
526
1,002
2,288
5,077
392
5,469

3,796
3,762

~

28,053
90,891
90,891

Government Expenditure
Government Consumption
Government Transfers
Interest on Debt
To Individuals
Subsiuies to Business"

Total Transfers
Total Government Expenditure
Surplus (+) or Deficit (-)
Total Government Receipts

2,898

77,517

708
909
376
1,993
4,891
578
5,469

4,861
1l,960
63
16,884
94,401
- 3,510
90,891

• Less current surplus of government enterprise.
Sources: U.K. Data: Cmnd. 123, White Paper on National Income, 1957.
U.S. Data: Dept. of Commerce, Survey oj Current Business, July, 1953.

TABLE XXXII

National Income in France: 1938,1952-55
(billions of francs)
1938

1952

1953

1954

1955

4,914
259

5,106
270

5,483
284

5,908
293

Origin of Income
Compensation of Employees
Wages and Salaries
173
Supplements
Social Security
Contributions by Employers II

Total Labor Income
Unincorporated Enterprise
Net Interest
Corporate Income

National Income

940

184 6TI3
131
8
33
356

3,564
15
1,063
10,725

991
1,100
~ ~
3,536
3,668
26
30
1,147
1,197
. 1l,024 . 1I,702

1,170

~

3,954
35
1,273
. 12,563

Sources: 1938 Data: Ministere des Affaires li:.conomiques et Financieres, Les Comptes £C01lomiques de fAnn.!e 1938, Paris, 1957.
1952 Data: Ministere des Finances, des Affaires li:.conomiques et du Plan, Rapport
sur les Comptes de la Nation, Paris, 1955.
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TABLE XXXIII

Personal income and Outlay in France: 1938,1952-55
(billions of francs)
1938

1952

1953

1954

1955

4,914
3,413
III
367
109
8,914

5,106
3,354
86
389
89
9,024

5,483
3,489
III
422
99
9,604

5,908
3,793
118
46-t
101
10,384

379

1,214
259
321
148
1,942
10,856

1,325
270
352
149
2,096
11,120

1,517
284
369
164
2,334
11,938

1,601
293
411
175
2,480
12,864

329

9,442

9,746

10,315

10,996

16
2

256
279
535

318
321
639

310
367

879

735

10,856

1l,120

311
343
654
969
11,938

Sources of income
173
Wages and Salaries
131
Unincorporated Enterprise
Interest Income
26
13
Dividend Income
Net Income from Abroad
Total Factor Income
~
Transfer Income
Social Security
SupplementsAssistance
War Damages
Total Transfer Income
Personal Income

Personal Outlay
Consumption
Taxes
Income
Social Security
Total Taxes
Personal Savings
Personal Income

19
17

-00

J:8
~
379

(ffj
1,191
12,864

• Social security benefits paid directly by l:ublic and private enterprises,
Sources: 19~8 Data: Minist~re des Affaires conomiques et Financi~es, Les Comptes £Can·
omiques de /'Annee 19)8, Paris, 1957,
1952 Data: Minis~re des Finances, des Affaires £conomiques et du Plan, Rapport
SliT les Comptes de la Nation, Paris, 1955.
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TABLE XXXIV
Government Receipts and Expenditures in France: 1938, 1952-55
(billions of francs)
1938

Government Receipts
Direct Taxes
16
Individuals
4
Corporations
Total Direct Taxes
Social Security Taxes
Individuals
2
Business Firms
10
Total Social Security Taxes --r2
Indirect Business Taxes
49
Total Tax Revenue
--8-1
Other Receipts·
2
Total Government Receipts---"S3

---w

Government Expenditure
Government Consumption
58
Government Transfers
Interest on Debt
18
Social Securi ty
19
Assistance
17
War Damages
Subsidies to Businesst
8
Total Transfers
~
Total Government Expenditure 120
Surplus
or Deficit (-) - 37
Total Government Receipts ---s3

<+)

1952

1933

1954

1935

310
492

670

318
489
807

31I
475
786

--so2

279
894
1,173
2,384
4,227
248
4,475

321
938
1,259
2,522
4,588
287
4,875

343
1,Q43
1,386
2,692
4,864
398
5,262

367
I,lll
1,478
2,762
5,Q42
338
5,380

2,292

2,405

2,408

2,371

126
1,219
321
148
471
2,285
4,577
102
4,475

1I2
1,330
352
149
528
2,471
4,876
I
4,875

141
1,523
369
164
537
2.734
5,142
120

153
1,607
411
175

256
414

D.~b2

596

2y42
5,51J

67
5,3i!O

• Including foreign aid,
t Less current surplus of government enterprise,
SourceS: 1938 Data: Ministere des Affaires £conomiques et Financieres, Les Comptes £conomiques de I' Annee 19J8, Paris, 1957,
1952 Data: Ministere des Finances, des Mfaires £conomiques et du Plan, Rapport
sur les Comptes de la Nation, Paris, 1955,
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TABLE XXXV

Personal Income and Outlay by Social Groups: 1952
Ibillions of francs)
SelfFarmers Employed

Sources of Income
Farm Production
'Vages and Salaries
1I7
Unincorporated Enterprise 1,313
Other Property Income
40
Total
1,470
From Transfers
Social Securi ty
68
Assistance
46
Other
20
Total
------r34
Personal Income
1,604
Personal Outlay
Consumption
1,512
Taxes
Income
15
Social Security
7
Total
------z2
Personal Savings
70
Personal Income
1,604

\Vage-

Earner!'

NonActive

Total

272
1,811
88
2,171

3,938
205
158
4,301

262

71
195
528

4,589
3,400
481
8,470

56
32
52
140
2,311

798
133
22
953
5,254

544
1I0
54
708
1,236

1,466
321
148
1.935
10,405

1,953

4,617

1,036

9,118

94
55
149
209
2,311

130
202
332
305
5,254

17
15
~
168
1,236

256
279
535
752
10,405

Source: Ministere des Finances, des Affaires tconomiques et du Plan, Rapport sur les
Comptes de la Nation, Vol. II, Paris, 1955_

TABLE XXXVI

Personal Income and Outlay by Income Range: 1952
Ibillions of francs)
A

Sources of Personal Income
From Production
Wages and Salaries
738
Individual Enterprise
298
Other Property Income
9
Total
1,045
From Transfers
Social Insurance
401
Assistance
96
Other
21
Total
518
Personal Income
1,563
Pasonal Outlay
Consumption
1,622
Taxes
Income
6
Social Security
37
Total
-----:r3
Personal Savings
102
Personal Income
1,563

B

Income Range'"
C

D

Total

2,251
713
54
3,018

1,207
1_096
138
2,441

393
1,293
280
1,966

4,589
3,400
481
8,470

741
120
25

280
66
21

-----s86

-------s67

3,904

2,808

44
39
81
164
2,130

1,466
321
148
1,935
10,405

3,506

2,370

1,620

9,118

61
120
181
217
3,904

85
82

104
40
144
366
2,130

256
279

--------w7
271
2,808

-------s35
752
10,405

• The income ranges are as follows:
A: Less than 535,900 francs
B: 535,900 to 932,000 francs
C: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs
D: Over 1,398,01)0 francs
Source: Ministere des Finances, des Affaire. tconomiques et du Plan, Rapport sur les
Comptes de la Nation, Vol. II, Paris, 1955_
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TABLE XXXVII

Sources of Personal Income within Social Groups
and by Income Range: 1952
(billions of francs)
Income Range'

A

B

Agriculture
272
Income from Production
47
Transfer Income
Personal Income
Self-Employed
Income from Production
32
16
Transfer Income
---"4s
Personal Income
Wage-Earners
703
Income from Production
323
Transfer Income
1,026
Personal Income
Nonactive
Income from Production
38
Transfer Income
132
Personal Income
J:7O
Total All Groups
Income from Production 1,045
518
Transfer Income
1,563
Personal Income

-m

C

484
45

D

' Total

529

331
25
~

383
17
400

1,470
134
1,604

263
49

-m

935
38

----m

941
37
978

2,171
140
2,311

2,221
444
2,665

1,020
139
1.159

357
47
404

4,301
953
5.254

50
348

----m

155
165
~

285
63
348

528
708
1,236

3,018
886
3,904

2,441
367
2.808

1,966
164
2,130

8,470
1,935
10,405

• The income ranges are as follows:
A: Less than 535,900 francs
B: 535.900 to 932.000 francs
C: 932,000 to 1,398,000 francs
D: Over 1.398.000 francs
Source: Ministere des Finances, des Affaires ~conomiques et du Plan, Rapport sur les
Comptes de la Nation, Vol. II, Paris, 1955.

TABLE XXXVIII

Distribution of Households and Population by Social
Group and Income Range: 1952
(in thousands)

Agriculture
Households
Population
Self-Employt:d
Households
Population
Wage-Earners
Households
Population
Nonactive
Households
Population
Total
Households
Population

A

B

Income Range·
C

788
3,221

689
2,816

295
1,209

198
804

1,970
8,050

91
295

274
885

875
2.829

585
1,891

1,825
5.900

2,1l7
6.737

3,666
1l,669

1,024
3,258

248
786

7.055
22,450

1,1l9
2,487

836
1,856

557
1.238

278
619

2,790
6,200

4,115
12,740

5,465
17,226

2.751
8,534

1,309
4,100

13,640
42,600

D

Total

• The income ranges are as follows:
A: Less than 535,900 francs
B: 535.900 to 932,000 francs
C: 932,000 to 1,398,009 francs
D: Over \.398.000 francs
Source: Ministere des Finances, des Affaires ~conomiques et du Plan, Rapport sur ies
Comptes de ia Nation, Vol. II, Paris, 1955.
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